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Technological advancement have seen South African government departments, 
state owned entities and private companies using cyberspace as a platform of 
interaction and the storage of information. Technological advancements have a 
positive impact due to the compression of space, time and thereby ensuring fast-
paced interaction across borders. These technological advancements have, however 
resulted in most organisations, both private and public, becoming prone to 
cybercrimes and related incidents. In an initiative aimed at countering these threats, 
the South African government has passed various laws. The National Cybersecurity 
Policy Framework (NCPF) is a South African Policy framework aimed at countering 
an increase in the occurrence of cybercrimes and related incidents.       
 
This research analyses the status in the implementation of the NCPF objectives 
allocated to the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services (DTPS). 
Then the barriers in the Implementation are unpacked guided by the literature 
reviewed and finally recommendations on how to counter the identified barriers are 
provided post the data collection. The report firstly provides an outline of the global 
perspectives on cybersecurity which is followed by the regional cybersecurity 
measures, and then the national cybersecurity measures proposed by the South 
African Government department are outlined. The latter parts of the report focuses 
on the NCPF in terms of its scope, goals, objectives and stakeholders. Finally, focus 
is shifted to the DTPS as a chosen area of research wherein data was collected in a 
form of one-on-one, semi-structured interviews with relevant parties. 
 
The results of this research are presented as a narrative description that is 
synthesised to develop the theoretical conjecture and empirical generalisation of the 
entire research. This research uncovered that there are numerous barriers in the 
implementation of the NCPF both within the DTPS as well as between the DTPS and 
various stakeholders entrusted with the implementation responsibility. The last 
chapter consists of general conclusions made by the researcher based on the 
research conducted which is then followed by recommended countermeasures 
which will be communicated to the DTPS as well as all stakeholders who will be 
affected by the proposed recommendations.     
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS  
 
AU   African Union  
ATM  Automated Teller Machine 
CECC  European Convention on Cybercrimes 
CERT  Computer Emergency response team 
CRC  Cybersecurity Response Committee 
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SAPS  South African Police Services 
SETA  Sector Education and Training Authorities  
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DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
 
Cyberspace: Nervous system, the control system of the country composed of 
hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches, and 
fiber optic cables that allow our critical infrastructures to work (Kuehl, nd). 
 
Cybercrime: Any criminal or other offence that is facilitated by or involves the use of 
electronic communications or information systems, including any device or the 
internet or any one or more of them (Electronic Communication and Transaction Act, 
2012) 
 
Cybersecurity: The body of techniques, processes and practices designed to 
protect networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or authorised 
access (whatis.com, 2015). 
 
Cyberpower: The ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence 
events in all the operational environments and across the instruments of power 
(Kuehl, nd). 
 
CSIRT: A team of dedicated information security specialists that prepares for and 
responds to information security incidents. When an incident occurs, members of a 
CSIRT can assist its constituency in determining what happened and what actions 
need to be taken to remedy the situation (Grobler and Bryk, 2010). 
 
Digital forensics: This is the process of uncovering and interpreting electronic data. 
The goal of the process is to preserve any evidence in its most original form while 
performing structured investigations (Technopedi, 2016).   
 
Cloud computing: New and emerging invention that changes the way Information 
Technology (IT) architects solutions are put forward in terms of moving towards 





E-government: Governments use of technology, particularly web-based internet 
applications, to enhance the access to and delivery of government information and 
service to citizens, business partners, employees, other government departments , 
and government entities (Ngulube, 2007) 
 
Information literacy: The persons’ ability to recognise when information is needed 
and have the ability to locate, evaluate and use effectively the information needed 
(Ngulube, 2007). 
 
New crimes: Crimes that can be committed solely with the aid or use of a computer 
(Herselman and Warren, 2012).  
 
Information literacy: The persons’ ability to recognise when information is needed 
and have the ability to locate, evaluate and use effectively the information needed 
(Ngulube, 2007).   
 
Trojans: Malware masquandering as something the user may want to download or 
install, that may perform hidden or unexpected actions; spy ware transmits 
information gathered from a computer, such as bank details to an attacker 
(Osuagwu, Ogiemien and Okide, 2010). 
 
WiFi: A local area network that uses high frequency radio signals to transmit and 














LIST OF ACTS AND REGULATIONS  
 
 African Chatter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and 
Administration of 2011 
 African Union Convention of Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection of 
2014.  
 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002. 
 European Convention on Cybercrimes of  2001  
 Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act no 27 of 1992  
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Figure 1: Services rendered by a CSIRT 































CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Cybersecurity is defined as “…the body of techniques, processes and practices 
designed to protect networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or 
unauthorised access” (whatis.com, 2015). These are all measures put in place to 
safeguard cyberspace users from cybercrimes and related incidents. The 
digitalisation of South African government departments has seen the gist of the 
interactions and information being stored in a virtual space. This has therefore 
resulted in cyberspace being vulnerable to cybercrime and related incidents.  
Cybercrimes can be regarded as new forms of crime which adversely affects all 
societies throughout the world. Herselman, et al (2010) postulate that cybercrime 
can be any kind of crime, ranging from hacking to more serious damage to 
intellectual property. The results of such crimes often leads to organisations both in 
the private and public sector losing money, mainly through the usage of computers 
and similar devices which are connected to the internet.  
There has recently been a drastic increase in cybercrimes and related incidents in 
South Africa (SA), a phenomenon which can be attributes to an increase in 
broadband access which has thus increased the number of internet users. The 
increase in internet accessibility has therefore resulted to vulnerabilities to 
cybercrimes as often times internet user do not adequately protect sensitive 
information thereby making them targets for cybercriminals. Cassim (2015) states 
that the lack of IT knowledge by the public and the absence of suitable legal 
frameworks to deal with cybercrime at national and regional levels has led to an 
increase in cybercrimes and related incidents.  
The speed with which the exposure to cyberspace  is increasing has left government 
departments and State Owned Entities (SOE’s) vulnerable to cybercrime and with 
insufficient countermeasures to keep up with the fast-paced cyber threats. Cassim 
(2015) furthermore asserts that the face of cybercrime has changed recently as a 
result of new internet environment, organised cybercrime groups and the 
development of new viruses. This change is as a result of the development of new 
accessible technologies and therefore the expansion of the internet has led to the 
developments of new forms of criminal behaviour. This has led to an increase in the 
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vulnerability of the African cyberspace and more specifically SA and as such “Most 
African states are lagging behind in strengthening cybersecurity and fighting 
cybercrime, cybercriminals have recognised this vulnerability and are targeting the 
continent” (Tamarkini, 2015, p.1).  
The fast paced rolling out of broadband accessibility in SA has led to most private 
and public organisations migrating to cyberspace as a medium of interaction and 
information storage. This advancement brings with it a number of vulnerabilities. Van 
Nieuwkerk  (2015) furthermore states  that the sophistication of and diversity of 
cyber-attacks are increasing and without proper cybersecurity measures the 
economic, political and social results of cybercrimes and cyber espionage can be 
devastating. The diversity of and fast speed with which new forms of cybercrimes are 
developing has therefore led to the South African government departments and 
SOE’s being vulnerable to cybercrimes as their cybersecurity measures cannot keep 
up with the  ever-changing cyber threats .   
As an initiative aimed at reducing and curbing the increasing cybercrimes and 
related incident, the South African cabinet approved the National Cybersecurity 
Policy Framework (NCPF) in March 2012. The NCPF is a government policy 
document which recognises that the state is charged with implementing a 
government led, coherent and integrated cybersecurity approach (National Cyber 
Security Policy Framework, 2012). The mandate to implement the NCPF was initially 
given to the State Security Agency (SSA), then it was handed over to the 
Department of Communication (DoC) whose name was changed to the Department 
of Telecommunications and Postal Services. The mandate was later in 2012 handed 
back to the SSA.   
This research was conducted with the main intension of uncovering whether or not 
the NCPF objectives allocated to the DTPS have been effectively implemented as 
projected when approved in 2012. Secondly, to uncover the barriers affecting the 
DTPS in the implementation thereof and to thus make recommendations which will 
be communicated to the DTPS and all relevant stakeholders who will be affected by 
the proposed recommendations. The researcher selected the DTPS as a research 
setting and therefore the  research was conducted in terms of assessing the status 
of implementation as well as the barriers of implementation of the three NCPF 
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objectives allocated to the NCPF namely; the establishment of a Cybersecurity Hub, 
the rolling out of a Cybersecurity Awareness Programme as well as to assist in the 
development of Sector Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT)s.  
 
The researcher conducted semi-structured one-on-one interviews with officials 
employed at the DTPS as well as those officials stationed at the Cybersecurity Hub.  
Based on the research conducted, it emerged that there are barriers in the 
implementation of the NCPF objectives. Due to the borderless nature of cyberspace, 
the barriers identified are not limited to the DTPS. Some counter-measures 
recommended by the researcher will only be effective with assistance from various 
other stakeholders mandated by the NCPF. This report fully outlines all the barriers 
uncovered during the research as well as the recommendations made by the 
researcher. Prior to focusing directly on the DTPS, the researcher firstly provided an 
overview of various published sources in the cybersecurity arena which is followed 



















SA has seen a digitalisation in the official interactions in government departments 
with cyberspace being the medium of communication and storing information. 
Cyberspace is gaining prominence in SA, as many geographical regions are 
incorporated into the global village in an attempt aimed at bridging the digital divide 
(Grobler, Van Vuuren and Leenen, 2007). This advancement brings various 
advantages to  the faced-paced communication in government departments and 
private companies as technology has got the capability of compressing time and 
space. As much as there are advantages to the advancements in technology, there 
are equally vulnerabilities to the information stored in the cloud as adversaries see 
this as a loophole when attempting to disrupt the operation of certain organisations.  
In an effort aimed at eliminating these vulnerabilities, the South African government 
has implemented various cybersecurity initiatives which will be discussed later in the 
report. The focus of this research report, however, is on the NCPF which was 
approved in 2012 and handed over to the former DoC whose name was in 2014 
changed to the DTPS. The NCPF is one of South African policy documents which 
was approved by cabinet and holds various government departments, led by the 
JSCP cluster, accountable to implement measures aimed at securing the 
cyberspace (Grobler et al., 2007). This mandate was in August 2012 given to SSA 
with the JCPS cluster still providing the oversight role (Grobler et al., 2007). 
The NCPF was developed with an intention of centralising the coordination of 
cybersecurity activities through relevant structures, policy frameworks and strategies 
in support of cybersecurity in order to combat cybercrime, to address national 
security imperatives and enhance the information society and knowledge based 
economy (Van Nieuwkerk, 2015). This research is therefore aimed at uncovering 
whether or not the NCPF is effective in achieving its objectives since implementation 
and if it has not successfully achieved its goals, to analyse the barriers to 
implementation. To achieve this, the researcher has posed three overall research 
questions which will analyse whether or not  the objectives of the NCPF have been 
attained since implementation, to analyse the key factors affecting policy outputs and 
impacts, and finally to propose measures which will assist in the effective 
implementation thereof.    
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When analysing the status of the South African cyberspace, the researcher chose a 
time frame of a 10 year period, from 2005 to 2015. The chosen time-frame gives the 
researcher sufficient time to analyse the status of the cyberspace before the NCPF 
was developed thereby unpacking the reasons and the need for the policy, 
thereafter, a focus will be on the years after the implementation of the policy 
framework with an intention of analysing the effectiveness of the policy proposal. 
After analysing the effective implementation, the researcher was in a position of fully 
analysing all factors either impeding or strengthening the policy implementation.  
Also of significance is the fact that the researcher chose to look at cybersecurity from 
three levels namely; international level, regional level and national level. This 
together with the chosen time-frame has enabled the researcher to fully outline and 
therefore thoroughly analyse cyberspace. This was done with an intension of 
assessing the status thereof prior to the implementation of the NCPF as well as the 
changes post the implementation thereof. As soon as all the factors have been 
outlined as well as the barrier in implementation have been unpacked, the 
researcher will then provide an outline of the comments and recommendations which 
are believed will assist in the effective implementation of the objectives outlined in 
the NCPF.   
 
The researcher thus selected the DTPS as it is one of the key government 
department mandated with the responsibility of implementing the NCPF. The 
researcher in this instance conducted one-on-one semi-structure interviews with five 
officials currently working with or who have previously worked with the 
implementation of the NCPF. Various barriers were identified by the researchers 
which are reported on in chapter five of this research. The researcher furthermore 
proposed recommendations which will be communicated to various critical role-
players are mandated by the NCPF. The key target is the DTPS as it was chosen as 
an area of research and therefore more barriers were uncovered therein. The 
researcher will in this instance compile a summary of the findings alongside the 
proposed recommendations, a copy of which will be sent to the department. The 
researcher will furthermore compile different short reports directed to relevant NCPF 
stakeholders who are affected by the barriers identified and who are required in the 




1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The NCPF as implemented in South African government department has not been 
successful in achieving its objective, which is the reduction and elimination of the 
growing cybercrimes and related incidents SA. This is as government departments 
and State Owned Entities are currently faced with an increase in such crimes. 
Mtsweni (nd) postulates that over 80% of government websites around the world are 
vulnerable to common web-based attacks and furthermore that over 50 South 
African website were hacked in both the government and the private sector in the 
year 2015. This is due to website developers that are slow or ignore the 
implementation of available and appropriate security countermeasures proposed to 
their organisations (Mtsweni, nd).  
 
There are various reasons which can be attributed to the lack of effectiveness in the 
implementation of the NCPF. The increasing bandwidth and use of wireless 
technology and infrastructure, high levels of computer illiteracy, and insufficient 
legislation to deal with cyber-attacks and threats are some of the factors which are 
barriers in the implementation of the NCPF (Grobler et al., 2007). Such reasons and 
various others are seen to be creating more risks to the already vulnerable South 
African cyberspace.   
 
This research is therefore aimed at uncovering the possible barriers in the 
implementation of the NCPF. The focus of this research is on those government 
departments which are the custodians of the NCPF with a specific focus on the 
DTPS. This research report provides feedback on the progress made since the 
NCPF was implemented on a national level, thereafter, the focus is shifted to the 
DTPS. The DTPS was chosen as an area of research due to it being the first 
national government department tasked with carrying out the NCPF mandate before 
the mandate was handed over to the State Security Agency (SSA) in August 2012. 
Furthermore, the DTPS is also responsible for the implementation of some of the 




One of the critical government departments mandated with implementing the NCPF 
is SSA. The DTPS also had a huge role in the implementation process as it was the 
initial custodian of the said policy framework. The researcher is of the view that the 
DTPS played a significant role in the implementation of the policy framework and 
thus officials at the DTPS are in a better position to understand the policy framework 
as they are the key custodians thereof, hence it was chosen as an area of research. 
Finally, to avoid conflict of interest and to adhere to the professional SSA code of 
ethics, the researcher was unable to use SSA as an area of research due to current 
professional obligations and therefore the restrictions which limits the researcher in 
terms of the amount of data to be collected for research purposes.   
 
This research has the capability of fully outlining the status of the South African 
cyberspace and also thoroughly uncovering the underlying barriers which are 
affecting the implementation of the NCPF as well as various other cybersecurity 
initiatives proposed by the South African government. Given the current status of the 
South African cyberspace, it can be agreed that there is not enough emphasis on the 
implementation of the proposals outlined in the NCPF. Various reasons can be 
provided for this and therefore this research will unpack all identified barriers. The 
literature review provides a solid starting point which will be verified by the data 
collected during the interview process.        
 
1.3 Purpose Statement 
 
The purpose of this research is in three forms, firstly it is to assess whether or not 
the NCPF was effectively implemented as intended and if not; to unpack and 
understand the barriers which are affecting the implementation thereof, and finally to 
make recommendations on how to effectively improve the implementation of the 
NCPF as well as various other policy proposals aimed at strengthening the South 







1.4 Research Questions 
Due to the robustness and diverse nature of this research, the researcher made a 
decision to have three overall research questions as outlined below; 
 
1. To what extent were the objectives of the NCPF attained since 
implementation? 
2. What key factors strengthen or impede policy outputs and impacts? 
3. What measures should be put in place to ensure the effective 
implementation of the NCPF? 
 
1.5 Draft Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter one of this report provides an introduction to the research thereby setting a 
scene for the chosen research area in terms of the problem statement, research 
problem, research objectives as well as the three overall research questions which 
provide guidance to the entire research. This section unpacks the problem statement 
in detail and the purpose of the research. It is in this section that the researcher 
outlined the reasons for the development of the NCPF by the South African cabinet. 
Furthermore, the researcher, in this section also outlined the key custodians tasked 
with the implementation of the NCPF, as outline later in the report, as well as the 
JCPS being tasked to provide the oversight role.    
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of all sources consulted in the research area. The 
purpose of the literature review is to provide an overview of all publications in the 
chosen research area. The global status of cyberspace will be outlined, followed by 
an overview of the South African cyberspace, the report will provide an outline of the 
cybersecurity measures proposed internationally, regionally and nationally, and 
finally the barriers in the implementation of the proposed cybersecurity measures in 
the South African context will be unpacked. As the means of analysing the status of 
the implementation of the NCPF and the barriers identified, the researcher made use 
of the 5-C protocol which acts as a model to be followed when analysing policy 
implementation. The components of the 5-C protocol namely; content, context, 
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commitment, capacity, clients and coalitions are fully outlined in the introductory part 
of the literature review as they provide guidance towards policy analysis.   
The third chapter of this report provides an overview of the research methodology 
which fully outlines the methodology followed by the researcher throughout the 
research. This research consists of a qualitative research methodology, the method 
of data collection is semi-structured interviews which were conducted at the DTPS. 
The researcher furthermore chose a non-probability sampling strategy with the 
purposive sampling method being chosen as the researcher deliberately decided to 
interview those individuals who are working in and around the implementation of the 
NCPF. A snow-ball sampling method was also utilised as the researcher also relied 
on referrals in terms of respondents to interview for data collection purposes.  
Chapter three furthermore outlined the method and approach of data analysis with 
the thematic approach being seen as the appropriate method to be followed by the 
research. A deductive approach to analysis was followed as the researcher already 
had preconceived codes guided by the literature. The research then outlines the 
ethical issues in conducting this particular study and as such provides an in-depth 
analysis of issues of anonymity and confidentiality. The last part of this section 
provides an outline of the possible risks which can be associated with the study as 
well as how the researcher aims to eliminate the possibility thereof as well as how to 
react should such possible risks be manifested.  
Chapter four focuses on the NCPF as the main focus point of the study. This chapter 
outlines the NCPF in terms of its goals and objectives, the stakeholders and role-
players, the underlying goals and objectives, the structure of the NCPF, the role 
played by the Cybersecurity Hub and sector CSIRT’s, and finally what elements are 
critical in the implementation of the NCPF. This section highlights the important role 
played by the JCPS Cluster in the implementation of the cybersecurity measures 
outlined in the policy framework through the JSCP implementation plan.  
Chapter five focuses on the research findings gathered during the data collection 
phase conducted at the DTPS. The researcher, in this section, provides an overview 
of the responses gathered from the interviews which is followed by an analysis 
conducted by the researcher in an effort aimed at addressing the research question. 
The researcher in this section provides an analysis of the findings gathered which is 
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supported by the literature review conducted in chapter two of this report. Once 
completed with the analysis, the researcher moves on to chapter six which focuses 
on the conclusions and recommendations. 
In chapter six, the researcher first makes conclusions based on the data gathered, it 
is in this section that the researcher outlines a total of eight barriers which are 
believed to be affecting the implementation of the NCPF according to the researcher. 
In the second part of this chapter, the researcher then makes recommendations 
which are aimed at addressing the identified barriers and which will be 
communicated to the DTPS as well as to relevant role-players as soon as the report 
has been authorised by the university. This is the only chapter which strictly consist 
of the researcher’s viewpoints which are believed to be aimed at adding value to the 
current practice in terms of the implementation of the NCPF.     
 
1.6 Significance of the research 
 
The South African government department and State Owned Entities (SoE) are 
using the internet as a medium of communication. This has had a positive impact on 
the fast-paced and interactive nature of communication which has led to the 
establishment of open and interactive communication and thereby increasing public 
trust in the government. Cyberspace, as the platform used for such communication 
and the storage of information has seen drastic developments in the contemporary 
times and as such, there are more developments aimed at making it more effective 
and efficient.  
 
As much as these advancements have a positive impact on the effectiveness of 
government departments and SoE’s, the developments brought about by cyberspace 
and cloud computing have created vulnerabilities and therefore loopholes which 
cyber criminals perceive as opportunities to commit cybercrimes which can be in 
various forms. This research is aimed at conducting an in-depth analysis of the 
current status of the South African Cyber space with more focus on the DTPS. The 
researcher will in this instance fully analyse the intended objectives of the NCPF and 
furthermore assess if they were effectively implemented or not. The researcher will 
also analyse if there are any barriers in the implementation of the said policy 
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framework and finally make recommendations on the effective implementation 
thereof. The recommendations will be communicated to the DTPS as well as to other 
stakeholders working in and around the implementation of the NCPF. This will be 
done in two forms; firstly by sending a summarised copy of this report to the intended 
department which will be accompanied by a letter requesting to conduct a 
PowerPoint presentation outlining the research findings alongside proposed 
recommendations.  
 
The researcher furthermore will assess and analyse how effective the DTPS has 
been in the implementation of those NCPF objectives of which were their 
responsibility. The researcher will in this instance analyse the effective 
implementation of measures such as the establishment of the of a national 
Cybersecurity Centre, the effective rolling out of a cybersecurity awareness program 
as well as the establishment of Sector CSIRTs since the approval of the NCPF in 
2012. This section will then be followed by an analysis of the barriers in the 
implementation of the NCPF which will be followed by the recommendations which 
will be proposed by the researcher.    
 
This research is aimed solely at adding value to the current status of the 
implementation of the NCPF, this is as the researcher intends sending a summarized 
copy of the report to the DTPS as well as to other stakeholders who are affected by 
the barriers identified and who the researcher believe are required in the 
implementation of the recommendations proposed at the end of this report. This 
report is highly valid as it is aimed at advising those departments involved in the 
implementation of the NCPF on how to effectively implement the policy proposal as 
projected.     
    
1.7 Conclusion 
 
This section of the report is an introductory section which has outlined the research 
purpose, problem statement, research questions, intended objectives and the 
significance of the research. The purpose of this research as outlined is to conduct 
an in-depth analysis of the NCPF with an intension of identifying the possible barriers 
in the implementation thereof and to furthermore make recommendation on how to 
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effectively implement it. To arrive at this however, the researcher will start by 
providing an international overview of the cyberspace which will be followed by a 
regional overview and finally a national overview which will be followed by an 
analysis of the barriers in implementation.   
 
This section has provided a solid background behind the purpose and scope of the 
research, it has outlined the three purposes of this research which included 
assessing whether or not the NCPF was effectively implemented, assessing any 
barriers in its implementation and finally to make recommendations on the effective 
implementation thereof. Due to the diverse nature of cybersecurity, there are three 
overall research questions which have been formulated with an intention of providing 
a solid direction towards achieving the research objectives namely; to what extent 
were the objectives of the NCPF attained since implementation? what key factors 
strengthen or impede policy outputs and impacts? what measures should be put in 
place to ensure the effective implementation of the NCPF? And finally, what 
measures should be put in place to ensure the effective implementation of the 
NCPF? 
The researcher then outlined the significance of this research which is highly 
significant as it is aimed at positively contributing towards making the NCPF more 
effective and finally towards assisting in curbing the growing cybercrimes and related 
incidents. The researcher furthermore intends making recommendations to 
stakeholders involved in the implementation of the NCPF on measures aimed at 
assisting in the implementation of the policy framework. The following chapter will 
provide an overview of various sources consulted in a form of a literature review. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth analysis of the secondary sources 
so as to ascertain what the view of various scholars on the subject of cybersecurity 













Chapter two provides an outline of the sources consulted in the chosen research 
area. The researcher consulted various sources which have assisted in providing 
guidance on the focus and scope of the research. All sources consulted are believed 
to be providing a solid background on the status of cybersecurity in SA as well as a 
thorough explanation of the NCPF since its inception until recently. As much as the 
research is aimed at unpacking the barriers affecting the NCPF, the chosen time-
frame is ten years, from 2005 to 2015, this is as the researcher believes that this 
period gives a clear picture of the South African cyberspace over an extended period 
of time. 
The NCPF is a policy framework which was decided on by the JCPS cluster as part 
of its mandate and obligations under outcome three/output seven (Institute for 
Security Studies, 2015). The NCPF is intended to provide a holistic approach and is  
supported by the national cybersecurity implementation plan; the JCPS, working in 
consultation with various government departments oversees the realization of the 
implementation plan; the JCPS Cybersecurity Response Committee (CRC), chaired 
by the State Security Agency (SSA) has been established to ensure the 
implementation of output seven further supported by the Cyber Security Centres 
(CSC); and finally, in terms of NCPF an approved Cyber Crime Strategy needs to be 
presented by the South African Police Services as the lead department (Institute for 
Security Studies, 2015). 
Approved in 2012, the overall objective of the NCPF is to centralise the coordination 
of cybersecurity activities through relevant structures, policy frameworks and 
strategies in support of cybersecurity in order to combat cybercrime, address 
national security imperatives and enhance the information security and knowledge 
based economy (Van Nieuwkerk, 2015). This section is primarily aimed at 
determining if the stakeholders tasked with the implementation of these policy 
proposals were effective in achieving their goals and objectives. This section will look 
at secondary data in forms of journal articles, books, research papers and various 
published dissertations with a focus on the subject matter.    
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This literature review will focus on the theoretical and academic discourse underlying 
the bodies of knowledge behind the status of the South African cyberspace between 
the chosen time-frame. Here the focus will be on how vulnerable the cyberspace is 
to cybercrime and related incidents. The second section will unpack various 
proposals made by the South African government departments in an effort aimed at 
curbing the growing threats to the cyberspace. Finally, the identified barrier in the 
implementation of such measures will be outlined. The 5-C protocol was chosen by 
the researcher as a model to be followed when analysing the effective 
implementation of the NCPF. 
2.2 The 5-C Protocol 
When analysing the effective implementation of the NCPF, the researcher followed 
the 5-C protocol which specifies the key elements in the policy implementation 
process. Policy implementation is regarded by Cloete and Wissink (2000) as not 
simply a managerial or administrative problem but rather a political process 
concerned with who gets what, when, how, where and from whom. The 5-C protocol 
can be regarded as an analytical framework  which shapes the route which policy 
implementation should take. “Five such variables emerge which are important causal 
factors for a multitude of scholars adhering to otherwise divergent perspectives (top-
down or bottom-up), working on differing issues (environment, education e.t.c), and 
in countries at various levels of economic development (Industrial or developing) 




The content of any policy proposed is crucial not only in the means it employs to 
achieving its ends, but also in its determination of the ends themself and also in how 
it chooses the specific means to reach the ends (Cloete et al., 2000). This therefore 
means that the content of any given policy is highly important as it outlines clearly 
the purpose, focus and intended objectives which are to be achieved by all 
stakeholders concerned. When analysing the implementation of policies, it is 
therefore important to study the contents, purpose and goals of a policy proposed. 
This is furthermore emphasised by Lowi in Cloete et al (2000) who characterises 
policy content as distributive, regulatory or redistributive. A mandate outlining the 
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reason for a policy should be stated alongside the content of any given policy. 
Grobler et al (2007, p.3) asserts that “If the government is involved, there needs to 
be an appropriate and explicit mandate for any CSIRT establishing operations. 
Generally, if the mandate comes from the most senior position in government as far 




Also of importance in the policy implementation process is the context within which 
the policy should be implemented. This refers to the institutional context which 
according to Cloete et al (2000) will necessarily be shaped by the larger context of 
the social, economic, political and legal realities in any given system. It is therefore 
important that there are effective working relations amongst all stakeholders involved 
in the implementation process in any given organisation, such effective relations 
often result from “bargaining, cajoling, accommodation, threats, gestures of respect 
and related transactions (Cloete et al., 2000, p.180). It is thus believed by Grobler et 
al (2007) that cultural backgrounds and working environments are of importance 
when implementing a policy, some of the problems relates to the cost and logistics of 
travelling between countries, decision-making and openness with regards to 




As much as the policy, content and implementation context are of importance, what 
is also critical is the attitude of all stakeholders entrusted with the responsibility of 
policy implementation. Without any commitment from officials employed in an 
organisation or contracted with policy implementation, a policy will not be effectively 
implemented as intended. This is despite the appropriate content and 
environmentally suitable context. Cloete et al (2000) believe that commitment will 
influence and be influenced by all four remaining variables namely content, context, 
capacity and clients or coalitions. Management commitment and support is also of 
importance in this regard and as such “A key element for any successful project is to 
obtain management support within the organisation driving the project. Management 
support should last throughout the project: from the planning to the implementation, 
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through to project closure. In addition, it is important that management support be 





Capacity is seen by Cloete et al (2000, p.181) as “… the structural, functional and 
cultural ability to implement the policy objectives of the government…”. This simply 
refers to the availability of and access to conserve both tangible and non-tangible 
resources to carry-out the tasks. The capacity factor is often a political matter as 
resource allocation deals with questions of who gets what, when, how, where and 
from who. The gatekeepers in any given organisation must ensure that the 
organisation is capacitated with all resources required in the policy implementation 
this include official equipment, staff members and moral support from organisational 
leaders. It is furthermore believed by Grobler et al (2010) that in addition to human 
resources, technical resources also play a key role in the policy implementation 
process. The project leaders establishing the national CSIRT should ensure that the 
team is able to purchase all needed equipments, accessories and systems, and 
finally there should be appropriate measures in place to monitor the progress of 
team members Grobler et al (2010).   
 
Clients and Coalitions  
 
Elmore in Cloete et al (2000, p.185) believes that “… implementation is affected, in 
some ‘critical sense’ by the formation of local coalitions of individuals affected by the 
policy to be one of the ‘most robust’ findings of implementation research”. During the 
policy development phase, the policy developers should at all times consider the 
interests of the policy end-user. A policy must therefore be tailored in such a manner 
that it caters for the needs, interests and desires of such individual. The clients are 
thus of importance as they can determine the effectiveness of a policy or the lack 
thereof. The clients and coalitions are effective stakeholders which can assist in the 
determination of the status of cybersecurity. Such individuals can also oppose, and 




2.3 The global status of cyberspace 
 
Cloud computing is a new and emerging invention that changes the way Information 
Technology (IT) solutions are put forward in terms of moving towards virtualisation of 
data storage, of local networks and softwares (Ramgovind, Eloff and Smith, 2010). 
The success of modern-day technology largely depends on the effectiveness of the 
world’s norms, its ease of use and finally the degree of information security and 
control (Ramgovind et al, 2010). Cassim (2015) postulates that cybercrime is not 
bound by geographical boundaries, “it is unnecessary for the perpetrator and the 
victim to meet, as the unlawful actions committed by the perpetrator in one country 
may have a direct and immediate effect in another (Cassim, 2015).  
 
The 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace defined cyberspace as “nervous 
(sic) systems- the control system of the country… composed of hundreds of 
thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches and fibre optic 
cables that allow our critical infrastructure to work” (Kuehl, nd). The concept of 
cybersecurity as defined earlier in the report is a global concept which is applied 
differently in various countries, however, the purpose being the same which is to 
secure the cyberspace. Incidents which occur on the cyberspace in any given time 
can have immediate effects in a country which is distant by geographical locations 
due to the compression of time and space which is brought about by the internet.   
 
Creditcard.com, a compiler of credit cards statistics, published in 2005 that 
approximately 9.2 million United States (US) citizens reported a loss of credit card 
information, furthermore 42% of all identity theft cases in 2004 involved credit card 
fraud (Osaugwu, et al., 2010). In 2002/03 the British Crime Survey revealed that 
18% of households with internet access stated that their computers have been 
affected by a virus, this had increased to 27% in 2003/04. Furthermore, the biennial 
Department of Trade and Industry Security Breaches Survey reported that 62% of 
UK businesses had a computer incident in 2006 (Osaugwu, et al., 2010). 
 
The Philippines were also victims of cybercrimes and related incidents. The 
Philippine’s failure to put cybercrime legislation in place resulted in a Philippine 
national inflicting damage during the 20th century without suffering any 
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consequences for this action (Cassim, 2015). The failure to have adequate 
legislations reverberated around the globe and illustrated the vulnerability of the 
modern network system. This therefore highlights that countries in both the 
developed and the developing states can at any point be affected by the cybercrimes 
and related incidents as such crimes are committed through the internet meaning 
therefore that they can be committed at a virtual point. 
 
Internet connectivity has grown significantly throughout the world, in both the 
developed and developing state. Africa, in particular has seen a huge increase in the 
number of people connected to the internet on a daily basis. The table below shows 
the current status of global Internet users, as well as the status of Internet users 
within the African continent (estimation based on December 2009 figures). Although 
the penetration of the Internet into Africa is minimal, the 1,809.8% with which the 
number of African users has grown from 2000 to 2009 is considerable. 
Unfortunately, this tremendous growth may be the catalyst of numerous threats to 
cyber space. (Grobler et al., 2007). 
 
Table 1: Internet User Statistics for Africa 








2.4 The status of South African cyberspace  
Studies have shown that cybercrime is a recent addition in the list of crimes. This 
phenomenon, according to Herselman and Warren (2010, p.25), “was not directly 
prosecutable in South Africa until the enactment of the ECT act in July 2002”. Van 
Nieuwkerk (2015, p.1) asserts that “the introduction of ICT in the public and private 
realism is forcing governments to face the realities of the security challenges that 
accompany such advancements. The sophistication and diversity of cyber-attacks 
are increasing and without proper cyber security measures the economic, political 
and social results of cybercrime and cyber espionage can be devastating”.  
Tamarkin (2015, p.1) states that African governments, the private sector and 
individuals increasingly rely on the internet to conduct sensitive transactions and 
store important data. This often results to cyberspace becoming vulnerable to 
cybercrime mainly due to that “Most African states are lagging behind in 
strengthening cybersecurity and fighting cybercrime; cyber criminals have 
recognised this vulnerability and are targeting the continent” (Tamarkin, 2015, p.1). 
This is despite the fact that more people are becoming exposed to the internet on a 
daily basis.   
The increasing vulnerability in the cyberspace has been “…compounded by the fact 
that some bureaucrats and politicians view the ICT revolution as a highly political 
affair and not a technical challenge” (Ngulube, 2007, p.2). As the world is migrating 
to the digital era whereby information is stored in the cloud, this often results to an 
emergence of threats to most countries. Ngulube (2007, p.2) provides an overview of 
the challenges facing Sub-Sahara Africa, “They include infrastructure development, 
law and public policy, digital divide, e-literacy, accessibility, trust, privacy, security, 
transparency, interoperability records management, permanent availability and 
preservation, education and marketing, public sector and private sector partnerships, 
workforce issues, cost structures and benchmarking.  
The draft African Union (AU) convention on the confidence and security in 
cyberspace stated that each AU member state has to undertake measures to 
develop capacity building measures, mainly in and around the cyberspace 
(Pieterse,2015). Various measures have been proposed in SA and as such some 
have been implemented while others are still in the planning phase. The status of the 
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South African cyberspace however still remains vulnerable to cybercrimes and 
related incidents.  
As of January 2014, the internet penetration rate in Africa was 18%, which is a 5% 
increase from 2013, the majority of internet users are located in Egypt, Morocco, 
Nigeria and SA while in some communities the internet reaches less than 1% of the 
total population mainly due to the lack of affordable and accessible internet (Rezaire, 
2014). SA’s access to the internet is above the 18% average in the continent and 
had reached 41% of the total population in 2014, however, 80.2% of South African 
users use smartphones to access the internet whilst 19.5% still use traditional 
methods, namely; household connection, internet cafés or connecting though work 
or university (Rezaire, 2014). It is stated by Osaugwu et al (2010) that many small 
businesses  and even large organisations do not know how to properly protect their 
sensitive data thus leaving the door open to criminals, more vulnerable remains the 
developing countries who are yet to develop new skills in computer forensic to tackle 
the menace. 
Until recently, a term coined ‘New Crimes’ was introduced in SA following the growth 
of cybercrimes and related incidents. New crimes is regarded by Herselman, et al 
(2010 as “…crimes that can be committed solely with the aid or use of a computer”. 
The most common of such crimes is hacking which has recently been criminalised 
following the enactment of the Electronic Communication and Transaction (ECT) Act 
of 2002. Another unique form is the denial of service attack (DoS) outlined in Section 
86(5) of the same act. “This occurs when the perpetrator sets up a computer 
program (possible a virus) that exploits the handshaking routine of regression” 
Herselman, et al (2010). 
Due to technological advancements, South African banks have recently been victims 
of cybercriminals. It is only in recent years that the focus is shifting to individuals, 
businesses and government. Herselman, et al (2010) indicated that banks have 
been exposed to cybercrime and it is expected that this trend will increase.  Bank 
fraud has been in the region of 50% internal and 50% outsider and most of the 
international jobs have relied on insider assistance (Gordon in (Herselman, et al., 
2010). More recently has been an incident wherein approximately 1600 fraudulent 
credit cards issued by Standard Bank were used to commit fraud in various 
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Automated Teller Machines (ATM) in Japan, the bank is believed to have incurred 
approximately R300 million in losses (Khoza, 2016). Furthermore, one of the 
reasons banks expect cybercrime to increase is that as the bank business and 
individuals move away from cash towards electronic transactions, physical crime will 
be less attractive and a move will be made towards cybercrime (Herselman, et al, 
2010). 
Due to the increasing connectivity which stems from broadband availability, 
information systems and networks are more prone to a growing number of cyber 
threats and vulnerabilities, this has furthermore resulted to hackers defacing more 
than 60 South African websites in the year 2003 (Herselman, et al., 2010). More 
recently, however, a group titled Anonymous claimed responsibility for defacing 
approximately 200 South African websites. These hackers leaked classified 
information belonging to government employees while at the same time exposing 
them to cybercrime. This incident occurred in February 2016 and the same group 
has indicated its intensions of attacking various countries throughout the African 
continent (Mokati, 2016).   
IT has brought about change in history that has been described using labels such as 
network age, information society and knowledge economy. Governments in the 
developing world, although prone to cybercrime, have been able to well respond to 
the problems being experienced, however, those in the Sub-Sahara Africa have not 
adequately restructured public bureaucracies in response to the demands of the 
information society (Ngulube, 2007). And as such had more vulnerabilities to the 
cyberspace with more cyber related incidents being reported in recent times.   
Most South Africa government departments are making use of the internet as a 
medium of interaction, this is seen in terms of the interaction between government 
departments and the general public, a term known as E-government. This simply 
“Refers to governments use of technology, particularly web-based internet 
applications, to enhance the access to and delivery of government information and 
service to citizens, business partners, employees, other government departments , 
and government entities” (Ngulube, 2007, p.10). The E-governments have got the 
capability of promoting a better life characterised by representative and participatory 
democracy, transparent, open and collaborative decision making, close relations 
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between government, enhanced service delivery and a seamless government 
service (Ngulube, 2007).  
In an effort aimed at rolling out such E-government, government departments were 
confronted with problems which have as a result affected the rolling out thereof as 
well as the security of such governments. These problems included infrastructure 
development, law and public policy, digital divide, e-literacy, accessibility, trust, 
privacy, security, transparency and records management (Ngulube, 2007). 
Information literacy refers to the persons’ ability to “recognise when information is 
needed and have the ability to locate, evaluate and use effectively the information 
needed” (Ngulube, 2007). This is also closely related to information security and 
awareness. The lack of such knowledge is one of the major problems facing SA in 
the contemporary times as the people lack the required skills and training in the 
information management as well as in the protection of sensitive information. African 
government departments have often been criticised for not focusing on cybersecurity 
measures and the training of relevant officials. Cassim (2015) postulates that 
“African countries are perceived to be preoccupied with attempting to be attending to 
issues such as alleviating poverty, the AIDS crisis, the fuel crisis, political instability, 
ethnic instability, and traditional crimes such as murder, rape and theft, as a result, 
the fight against cybercrime is lagging behind.  
There also have been new and innovative forms of cybercrimes which ultimately 
affected SA government departments. An incident occurred at the Mpumalanga 
Department of Education where a suspected cyber hacker stole R5.5million from the 
department’s bank account The North Gauteng High Court awarded a court order to 
seize the account of a person believed to be a suspect, only R1543 345.00 could be 
seized as the remainder was shipped off and disappeared without a trace (Cassim, 
2015). This occurred as there were insufficient measures in place to secure the 
cyberspace and as such led to more vulnerabilities thereto. 
Phishing is also seen as a new form of cybercrime which is heavily affecting banks in 
the country at large. Phishing is found to be the most common type of fraud which 
involves the online theft of internet user identities. “The South African Banking Risk 
Information Centre (SABRIC) has reported that the incident of phishing has more 
than trebled since January 2001” (Cassim, 2015, p.131).  A report by the 
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TrendMicro, an ICT security company, concluded that Africa is becoming a 
cybercrime safe harbour because of increase internet availability at lower costs, a 
rapidly growing internet user base as a depth of cyber laws on the continent 
(Tarmakini, 2015). Cybercriminals are, according to Tarmakini (2015) developing 
more advanced and lucrative forms of cybercrimes which involves the use of 
botnets, remote access, Trojans and various malwares, African states on the other 
hand fail to adequately address the evolving cybercrime problems which adversely 
affects the national economy and national security.  
Unlike physical crimes, the perpetrators and victims of cybercrime are not bound by 
geographical boundaries as all cybercrimes are committed on the internet. This is 
also emphasised by Tarmakini (2015) who postulates that the transnational nature of 
most crimes contributes to the complexities of sovereign, jurisdiction , extraterritorial 
evidence and international co-operation. Additionally, the issues faced also remains 
“extradition, mutual legal assistance, mutual recognition of foreign judgements, and 
information police-to-police cooperation” (Tarmakini, 2015, p.2).  
Also adding to the vulnerability of the South African cyberspace is the increase 
usage of social network pages. Goredema (2012) made an observation that the 
primary sources of risks are also the increase in the number of people sharing 
information through internet facilitated social networking sites as well as the 
phenomenal growth in the use of computer devices in the form of smartphones. Data 
released by the International Data Corporation in 2014 indicted that the Global Sales 
of mobile phones have escalated from R1.391billion in 2010 to R1.546billion by the 
end of 2011, at that stage, there were R5.9bn mobile phone users and SA had 
approximately R42.3million contract subscribers.      
The figures furthermore indicate that 65% of South African households have got 
access to a cellular phone on contract compared to only 20% who only have access 
to a landline, the highest of this population being in the Gauteng Province with 48%, 
followed by Western Cape with 43% and the lowest being in the Eastern Cape with 
24% (Gorendema, 2012). The danger with the usage of these devices is that users 
are often not aware of the potential criminal uses of some of the information 
transmitted and therefore unwillingly provide adversaries with sensitive information 
thereby giving them leverage to commit crime.  
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Due to the global interconnectivity of the internet, its borderless nature, its 
anonymity, fastness and its ability to store high volumes of rich data such as financial 
data, personal information, military information and business information, 
cybercriminals can easily build complex systems aimed at stealing money and 
information thereby causing damage to the economy which is equivalent to more 
than that of counterfeit goods and/or narcotics trade (Tarmakini, 2015).  
Furthermore, most developing countries, such as SA lack adequate laws which 
criminalise cybercrime, they lack the means to enforce existing statutes, have got 
few tools to investigate cybercrime and thus lack sufficient infrastructure for 
information sharing and international co-operation (Van Nieuwkerk, 2015). Until 
recently, cybercrimes were not directly prosecutable in SA and even after the 
cybercrimes have been prosecutable, it still remains a problem as law enforcement 
agencies are either not fully trained on how to respond to a cyber-incident or do not 
have the required technology to gather evidence where required.  
The lack of knowledge has been seen as one of the other factors affecting SA in the 
modern era, this lack of knowledge leads to unsecure behaviour by internet users 
and as such this lack of the relevant knowledge has made the African population 
easy targets for hackers and botnet operators (Von Solms, 2015). Despite the low 
internet penetration rate, SA ranks third in the world after the United States of 
America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) in terms of the number of cyber-
attacks encountered (Amit in Grobler et al., 2007).   
Also to take note is the time delay between policy enactment and implementation,  
this is highlighted by Van Nieuwkerk as he states that “Due to the swift evolution in 
cybercrime techniques and advancements in ICT, policy makers must be quick to 
shorten the gap between development and efficient implementation of policy” (Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2015, p.1). The results of this are often that the policies are out-dated 
during their intended implementation phases. There are various reasons for such 
delays most of them often being administrative in nature and some often involving 
the lack of adequate resources to fully implement the policy.  
Goredema (2012, p.1) believes that “the scope of activities which could fall within the 
definition of cybercrime is very broad ranging from purely malicious or intimidatory 
invasion of privacy, to the theft and abuse of personal identity particulars and the 
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fraudulent manipulation of electronic data to commit theft”. An example of malicious 
invasion can be seen as hacking, which is defined by Herselman, et al (2010, p.254) 
as “the unauthorised access of a computer system or network”. Osuagwu et al 
(2010, p.22) provide an overview of types of attacks to computers or computer 
networks.  
Common types of malware works in four forms namely; viruses, which infects a 
computer and are passed by user activity; worms, self-propagate using an internet 
connection to access vulnerabilities on other computers and to install copies on 
them; Trojans are malware masquandering as something the user may want to 
download or install, that may perform hidden or unexpected actions; spy ware 
transmits information gathered from a computer, such as bank details to an attacker 
(Osuagwu et al., 2010, p.22).  
Another critical problem facing SA is the absence of formalised organisations 
mandated to carry out cyber security. This is closely related to the context and 
commitment aspects of the analytical framework discussed earlier in this section. 
This is highlighted by Van Nieuwkerk (2015, p.2) as he states that “The absence of 
assigned agencies in many African nations to address issues of cybersecurity makes 
it unlikely for coordinated policy decisions to be made”.  There are however, other 
formalised organisations established which are not as effective as they are intended 
to be due to a lack of sufficient resources both human and non-human. This is 
furthermore emphasised by Cassim (2015, p.127) as he states that “African 
countries have also been criticised for dealing inadequately with cybercrime, as their 
law enforcement agencies are inadequately equipped in terms of personnel, 
intelligence and infrastructure”. The shortage of these critical resources can be 
attributed to a number of factors such as the lack of knowledge.  
Another issue facing the South African government is the complications related to 
prosecuting cyber criminals, known as capacity in the 5-C Protocol. (Cassim, 2015, 
p.125) emphasises that “Criminal laws regulating cyberspace tend to result in few 
prosecutions due to the judicial difficulties and additional resources required in 
tracking down cyber criminals in different countries”. History has proven that until 
recently, there have been a number of cyber criminals which were not prosecuted 
mainly due to a lack of applicable laws to prosecute cybercrime. With these identified 
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vulnerabilities, the South African government has proposed various counter 
measures, and the following section unpacks them. 
2.5 Current cybersecurity measures  
 
2.5.1 Internationally 
Internationally, the European Convention on Cybercrimes (CECC) was signed in 
Hungary on 23 November 2001 and is aimed at encouraging countries to curb 
cybercrimes (Cassim, 2015). The main objective of the CECC is to advance a 
common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime more 
specifically by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-
operation (Cassim, 2015). This convention was signed by SA as it criminalises 
certain computer crimes such as the interception of non-public transmission of 
computer data, it establishes corporate liability, it calls for the production of stored 
computer data and recommends mutual assistance between countries in 
cybercrimes investigations (Cassim, 2015).  
The CECC provide a sound basis for essential cross-border law enforcement co-
operation which are required to combat cybercrimes; it serves as a purpose built 
mechanism on which countries can design their own domestic legislations and 
enhance international co-operation in relation to cybercrime (Cassim, 2015). As 
much as the CECC was signed by SA, it has however, not been ratified.  The CECC 
can furthermore be regarded as the comprehensive powers to expedite preservation 
of stored computer data and partial disclosure of traffic data, its intentions are to 
make production orders, search computer systems, seize stored computer data, 
enable real time collection of traffic data and finally intercept the content of 
questionable electronic data (Pieterse, 2015).  
According to Cassim (2015, p.126) “The CECC criminalises certain computer actions 
such as the integration of non-public transmission of computer data; establishes 
corporate liability; calls for the production of stored computer data; and recommends 
mutual assistance between countries in investigations”. The CECC was adopted by 
SA, it was however, not been ratified due to a number of factor most of being political 
in nature. It has however acted as a good guideline when public sector policies were 
developed in relation to cybersecurity.    
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The USA established the US/SA cyber working groups. These working groups 
identified areas of mutual interest and strengthened opportunities for cooperation 
(Pieterse, 2015). The focus of the US/SA cyber working groups is on the provision of 
technical assistance, capacity building, training and the sharing of best practices 
between the USA and SA. Also projected by the working groups is that future 
meetings held will also include private sector and civil society stakeholders. Since 
USA is more advance when compared to SA, they in this instance provide training in 
all areas of needs as determined by SA.  
 
2.5.2 Regionally  
Regionally, there have been various initiatives aimed at addressing the increasing 
cybercrimes and related incidents in SA. The AU has created the African Chatter on 
the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration which speaks to 
issues of access to information and the role of ICT in the delivery of services (Van 
Nuewkerk, 2015). As part of its objectives, the AU African Chatter on the Values and 
Principles of Public Services and Administration aims to contribute to improving the 
working conditions of public service employees and to protect their rights (Yankey, 
2013). The chatter furthermore strives to encourage efforts made by State Parties 
aimed at modernising the administration and the building of capacities in order to 
improve the quality of public services rendered (Yankey, 2013). 
 
As an AU member state, SA adopted the AU convention of cybersecurity and 
personal data protection in 2014. The convention has however not been ratified and 
will only be ratified when it has been accepted by at least 15 AU member states out 
of a total of 56 member states, if adopted and ratified, it can play a critical role in 
improving cybersecurity in Africa (Von Solms, 2015). This factor displays a lack of 
commitment by stakeholders concerned as a critical factor in the 5-C protocol. This 
convention can be used by countries in various ways such as in conducting a self-
assessment by a specific country against the specifications of a convention as well 
as in comparing a country with various AU member states to assess how they 
compare as far as the set requirements are concerned (Von Solms, 2015). 
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This convention was a culmination of the process which started with the Oliver 
Tambo Declaration at an extraordinary session of the AU in 2009, here the member 
states were required to jointly develop “…a convention on cyber legislation based on 
the continents’ needs and which adheres to the legal and regulatory requirements on 
electronic transactions, cybersecurity, and personal data protection” (Tarmakini, 
2015, p.3). This convention was later adopted in June 2014.  
The AU convention requires African States to adopt laws which criminalises attacks 
on computer systems (fraudulently accessing a computer system), computerised 
data breaches (fraudulently intercepting data), content-related offences 
(disseminating child pornography) and offences relating to the electronic message 
security measures (Tarmakini, 2015). This convention furthermore requires African 
States to establish appropriate institutions to combat cybercrimes and to offer 
training to those stakeholders tasked with countering cybercrime, this furthermore 
emphasises the importance of enhancing international co-operation to fight 
cybercrime (Tarmakini, 2015). Finally the AU convention requires African states to 
enact cybercrime offences that are punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal penalties (Tarmakini, 2015).   
 
2.5.3 Nationally 
Cybersecurity has been a priority in the South African government since the early 
1990’s, this is evident as there are various legislations which have been passed from 
as early as 1992. Van Nieuwkerk (2015, p.3) states that these legislations consists of 
“(a) interception and monitoring prohibition act of 1992 which focuses on telephonic 
and postal communication and its legal interception; (b) prevention of organized 
crime act of 1998 introduced measures to help combat organised crime, money 
laundering and gang activity; (c) electronic communications and transaction act of 
2002 which aims to facilitate and regulate electronic communication and 
transactions” Van Nieuwkerk (2015, p.3). 
The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act no 27 of 1992 (IM) was approved 
with an intention of addressing the identified cyber threats. The purpose of this act is 
“To prohibit and intercept certain communication and the monitoring of certain 
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conversations; to provide for the interception of the postal articles and 
communications and for the monitoring of conversations in the case of a serious 
offence or if the security of the republic is threatened; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith (Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992, p.1). This is 
one of the earlier policy proposals made in the country and was able to set the scene 
and following its implementation, more advance policies were proposed. This act 
was implemented in some aspect however it could not achieve all objectives set 
mainly due to amongst others, a lack of organisations to carry out the mandate.   
Following the promulgation of the IM Act, there had been an increase in the use of 
advance telecommunication technologies including cellphones, satellite 
communications, emails and various other modes of electronic communication 
(Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992). The IM, though effective, 
currently needs to be updated or to be supported with more modern policies in order 
to keep pace with the ever-changing cyberspace. This is due to the dynamic and 
ever-changing nature of the cyberspace as well as the more active and highly 
dynamic cybercriminals. 
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Act (POCA) no 121 of 1998 is aimed at 
introducing measures aimed at combating organised crime, money laundering and 
criminal gangs, to prohibit racketeering activities, to provide for the prohibition of 
money laundering and for obligations to report certain information and to criminalise 
certain activities associated with gangs (Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998). 
POCA embodies an aggressive parliamentary stance against a rapid growing trend 
of organised crime, money laundering and criminal gangs (Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act, 1998). With regards to cybercrimes, this Act is not direct in the crimes 
covered, it merely refers to them as organised crimes. This Act was promulgated in 
1998, it was less effective with regards to cybersecurity and as such more direct 
approaches needed to be established. 
Various reasons can be provided for the lack of effectiveness in all the earlier Acts 
and policies proposed, Van Nieuwkerk (2015) believes that though these laws exist, 
their effectiveness have diminished overtime due to the insufficient training given to 
stakeholders entrusted with the implementation responsibility. This relates to the lack 
of the capacity aspect outlined in the 5-C protocol. What is therefore required in this 
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instance is to either amend the act or to formulate a policy which supports the actual 
implementation of the Acts outlined. Furthermore, the training of relevant officials 
should be made a key priority by all organisations concerned.  
Also of significance, is the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA) 
of 2002. The ECTA was promulgated in 2002 with the main objective being “To 
provide for the facilitation and regulation of electronic communications and 
transaction in the public interest” (Cassim, 2015, p.27). The act introduces new 
forms of crimes which are punishable under the law, crimes such as anti-cracking 
and hacking laws are introduced in the act, the latter being a law prohibiting the 
selling, designing or producing of anti-security circumventing technology (Cassim, 
2015).  
The objectives of the ECTA are to provide for facilitation/regulation of electronic 
communication/transactions to provide for the development of a national e-strategy, 
to promote universal access to electronic communication transactions, to prevent 
abuse of information systems and to encourage the use of E-government services 
(Pieterse, 2015). This act provides a legislative environment for secure electronic 
transactions in SA, it compels the Minister of Communications to have due regard for 
international best practices when it comes to electronic transactions matters, it 
introduced the concept of consumer protection by protecting consumers from 
unsecure communication, and furthermore sets out principles that govern the secure 
protection of personal information (Department of Telecommunication and Postal 
Services , 2009).  
The Electronic Communications Transaction Act (ECTA) was enacted by the former 
South African president Thabo Mbeki in 2002. This act “repealed the previous 
computer evidence Act” (Herselman, et al., 2010, p.254). This act according to 
Herselman, et al (2010, p.256) protects companies and individuals against theft, 
interception or interference of information; theft, fraud, forgery and extortion; aiding 
abetting cybercrime; and it also provides for penalties of contravening the act.  
One of the definitions outlined in the act is that of access, which “includes actions of 
a person who, after taking note of any data, becomes aware of the fact that he or 
she is not authorised to access the data and still continues to use the data 
(Electronic Communication and Transaction Act, 2002). The actions of such an 
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individual are, according to the Act punishable under law and could lead to either a 
fine or imprisonment. The ECTA mainly protects companies and individuals against 
theft, interception, or interference of information; theft, fraud, forgery and extortion; 
aiding and abetting cybercrime; and the act also provides for penalties of 
contravention (Herselman and Warren, 2010). Crimes listed under the ECTA 
includes; unauthorised access, illicit tempering with files, or data, computer networks 
sabotage; use of information systems to commit or advance traditional crimes; 
computer-related espionage; violation against privacy by acquisition of computer 
data and the theft or damage of computer hardware or software (Herselman, et al 
2010). 
The Act furthermore created cyber-inspectors, those officials authorised to enter 
premises with an intention of obtaining information regarding cybercrimes (Cassim, 
2015). As much as the cyber-inspectors are authorised to invade peoples properties 
with an intension of gathering data to be used as evidence when conducting an 
investigation, they are at times in conflict with the constitution as they are perceived 
as being in violation of section 14 and 25 of the South African constitution which 
deals with the right to privacy and the right to property respectively (Cassim, 2015).  
The South African banking sector has seen the establishment of the South African 
Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), a Non-Government Organisation aimed 
at combating crime in the banking sector. SABRIC according to Cassim (2015) 
provides the banking industry with crime the latest risk information management 
services and facilitates inter-bank initiatives to reduce the risk of organised bank-
related crimes, through effective public-private partnership. SABRIC has created a 
platform for the police to collaborate with the banks and the IT industry in an effort 
aimed at combating cybercrime. Following the establishment of SABRIC, the South 
African banking sector has been very strict in terms of compelling banks to provide 
their clients with a safe and secure banking environment, failure to meet the set 
obligations could result to banks being held liable and therefore at times being sued 
for any losses incurred (Cassim, 2015). 
The DTPS has got a responsibility of developing policies and industry standards 
concerning communication, the Department of Defence and Military Veterans is 
responsible for the implementation of cyber defence measures as it pertains to the 
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national defence mandate, and the Department of Science and Technology in the 
realm of cybersecurity Van Nieuwkerk (2015, p.4). All these departments work 
closely in terms of securing the South African cyberspace as well as in fighting the 
cybercrimes and related incidents.  
The SA government has also partnered with academia in not only training its officials 
but also creating an awareness of cybersecurity in the public sector. In March 2014, 
the former Minister of SSA Dr Siyabonga Cwele provided a keynote address in a 
cybersecurity colloquium held at the WITS School of Governance. The colloquium 
was very successful in providing a platform for substantive discussion on the policy 
development management and capacity building issues in the arena of cybersecurity 
(The Cybersecurity Colloquium, 27 March 2014). One of the discussion points was 
the NCPF which is the focus of this research. 
The NCPF was approved in 2012. The overall objective, according to Van Nieuwkerk 
(2015, p.3) being “…to centralise coordination of cybersecurity activities through 
relevant structures, policy frameworks and strategies in support of cybersecurity in 
order to combat cybercrime, address national security imperatives and enhance the 
information society and knowledge based economy”. The NCPF outlined its purpose 
as being “…to create a secure, dependable, reliable and trustworthy cyber 
environment that facilitates the protection of critical information infrastructure whilst 
strengthening shared human values and understanding of cybersecurity in support of 
nation security imperatives and the economy (National Cyber Security Policy 
Framework, 201, p.15).  
2.6 Reasons for ineffective cybersecurity measures in South Africa 
It has been observed over the years that “Despite the time and effort put into the 
development of the policy framework, the process of implementation is still not 
complete” (Grobler, et al., 2007, p.1). There are various reasons which can be 
attributed to the failure thereof, most of them being administrative in nature often 
resulting to a lack of adequate resources required to effectively carry out the policy 
implementation. This section will unpack the reasons as published by various 
authors in the cybersecurity space.  
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The NCPF outlined in its milestones that it will establish the CSIRT and the CSERT 
at the end of March 2012, this however could not be achieved due to political will as 
there were mandate changes which resulted to the mandate being handed over to 
the DTPS Grobler et al (2010). This mandate was later on given to SSA. The results 
thereof led to there being a time-delay between policy development and policy 
implementation and as a result some of the measures proposed in the NCPF are 
currently not implemented as projected. 
Another problem facing SA is the lack of adequate laws to make arrest and charge 
cyber criminals, this can also be regarded as a lack of  capacity as outlined in the 5-
C protocol Cassim (2015, p.125) states that “Police officials cannot prosecute cyber 
criminals unless countries have adequate laws in in place outlawing such criminal 
activities”. Currently laws are being passed in SA, however they are not effective as 
law enforcement agencies do not have a thorough understanding of cybersecurity as 
well as various laws which are applicable. As alluded to earlier in the literature 
review, SA has adopted the CECC however, is has not ratified it. 
Also related to the latter is the fact that there are currently weak penalties imposed 
on cybercriminals. The weak penalties in most updated criminal statutes provide 
limited deterrence for crimes that can have large-scale economic and social effects 
(McConnell International.2000). Also related to this is the fact that there are no 
measures in place to effectively prosecute a cybercriminal. This often leads to 
cybercriminals deliberately committing cybercrime often well aware that there will 
either be minor penalties imposed or no penalties all together, a practice termed 
impunity.  
 
The diverse nature of the cybercrimes often leaves the governments’ proposed 
cybersecurity measures outdated thereby unable to keep up with the ever-changing 
cybercrimes. Pieterse (2015) emphasises this aspect as he states that rapid 
developments and the exploitation of computers will continue to accelerate, with a 
concomitant increase in cybercrime threats and incidents and as such cyber 
criminals are becoming more sophisticated as they continue to develop new 
malicious software and also devising improved methods for infecting computers and 




A lack of awareness is also a factor affecting cyber security especially in government 
departments. Goredema (2012, p.2) furthermore postulates that “At this point, 
awareness of risks and how to mitigate them does not appear to be spreading as 
quickly as the escalation in the use of cyber-technology”. The SA government 
officials are exposed to the cyberspace on a daily basis, however, they are not well 
acquainted and therefore unaware of the threats they are exposed to as well as 
various countermeasures currently in place.   
Also adding to the lack of awareness is the absence of African languages in 
cyberspace. The absence of African languages according to Grobler et al (2007) 
“has a direct impact on the vulnerability of the African cyberspace due to a lack of 
cognizance”. Most often, computer users willing to learn about cyberspace are 
restricted to do this, because African languages are used minimally in cyberspace 
(Grobler et al., 2007). This therefore often leads to these users unwittingly disclosing 
sensitive information which is often used by adversaries when committing 
cybercrime.   
 
While the effects of cybercrime and all cyber related threats are well published 
globally, there is very little research currently available in SA especially within the 
government context. This is highlighted by Herselman et al (2010, p.256) as they 
postulate that “Research needs to be done on how badly South African companies 
are affected by cybercrime (if at all) and whether the newly promulgated laws will aid 
in preventing and prosecuting these crimes”. This often results in a lack of 
cybersecurity awareness. Also related to the lack of capacity by stakeholders tasked 
with the implementation of cybersecurity-related policies.   
An effective law enforcement system is complicated by the transnational nature of 
and diversity of cyberspace, this is as the mechanisms of cooperation across 
national borders to solve and prosecute crimes are complex and as a result slow 
(McConnell International.2000). Cyber criminals are well aware of this deficiency and 
often deliberately defy the conventional jurisdictional realms of sovereign nations, 
originating an attack from almost any computer in the world, passing it across 
multiple national boundaries, or designing attacks that appear to be originating from 
foreign sources (McConnell International.2000). Such techniques drastically increase 
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both the technical and legal complexities of investigating and prosecuting 
cybercrimes. 
 
Another problem is that the resources required in conducting a cyber-related 
investigation are often substantial while the crime may be high tech and as such 
investigating it often involves a substantial amount of traditional investigative work as 
well as highly technical skills which tends to be lacking in a country such as SA 
Pieterse (2015). This is the lack of commitment and capacity in terms of the 5-C 
protocol.  There are also  few organisations mandated to train such investigators and 
therefore often time the service is procured form international companies which is 




This literature review has exposed the researcher to the current status of the South 
African cyberspace. When conducting research, the researcher was exposed to 
various threats in the SA government department as well as various measures 
introduced to curbs the spread of cybercrime. The focus of this research is on the 
barriers in the implementation of the NCPF, therefore, the researcher was exposed 
to common reasons for the ineffectiveness of the NCPF.  This literature review 
exposed the researcher to a highly dynamic subject that is gaining prominence in SA 
as well the effectiveness of the NCPF in government departments.  
The section of the research provided an in-depth overview of the sources consulted 
in the subject area. The researcher started off by presenting an international 
perspective on the status of cybersecurity whereby, the current impact of 
cybercrimes and related incidents on a global scale was provided with a focus on the 
US, UK and the Philippines. The researcher in this instance made mention of the 
growing impact of cybercrime in these countries with an intention of outlining that 
though developed, such countries are also victims of cybercrime. 
The researcher also provided an outline of the international cybersecurity measures 
which SA is also party to. The researcher, in this instance made reference to two 
important international measures namely the CECC which is aimed at advancing the 
common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime more 
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specifically by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-
operation; the US/SA cyber working groups was also referred to as working groups 
which identifies areas of mutual interests and strengthened opportunities for 
cooperation.  
Regionally, there are also various initiatives which are established with a common 
purpose of curbing and reducing the growing cybercrimes and related incidents. The 
AU African Chatter on the Values and Principles of Public Services and 
Administration was referred to as a chatter which is aimed at contributing towards 
improving the working conditions of public service employees and to protect their 
rights, this convention is also regarded as a convention which can be used by 
countries in various ways such as in conducting a self-assessment by a specific 
country against the specifications of a convention as well as in comparing a country 
with various AU member states to assess how they compare as far as the set 
requirements are concerned  
Nationally, reference was made on various measures introduced by the South 
African government departments. Reference was made to the Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act no 27 of 1992 (IM), the Prevention of Organised Crimes 
Act (POCA) no 121 of 1998, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
(ECTA) of 2002., the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC),  and 
the NCPF of 2012 which is the focus of this research. The research clearly outlined 
the main reasons behind the formulation of these policies as well as their key 
objectives and finally how they intend reaching their objectives.  
This section of the literature review ended with an analysis of the effectiveness of the 
South African cybersecurity measure as well as the reasons behind the barrier on 
implementation. To achieve this, the researcher consulted various sources who all 
have a common ground which states that there are barriers in the implementation of 
the NCPF. Various barriers are outlined and they range from administrative problem, 
political problems, capacity contains ineffective criminal justice system, unclear legal 
system as well as the lack of funding in some instances.  The next chapter will focus 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The focus of this chapter is on the selected research methodology and the method of 
data collection. This research will follow a qualitative research design as the 
researcher intends to gather the first account of data through the usage of qualitative 
methods of data collection. The researcher in this instance gathered data directly 
from the respondents and as such the qualitative research design was seen as a 
suitable form of research design. This section of the report will fully outline the 
strategy which will be followed in arriving at answering the research question.  
 
This is an interpretative research which is inductive in nature as the researcher will 
move from the specifics to the general and therefore the conclusions will be guided 
by the data inductively gathered during the data collection phase. Survey research 
has been chosen as a method of data collection with a specific focus on the DTPS 
as a case study. The researcher has in this instance conducted semi-structured 
interviews to available respondents at the DPTS. Appointments were confirmed prior 
with the respondents and each interview approximately 20minutes. The researcher 
reserved additional days to spend at the DTPS premises post the data collection and 
also communicated the dates with the respondents thereby inviting them in cases 
where there is additional information to be communicated to the researcher.  
 
This research followed a non-probability sampling strategy as the respondents were 
included in the research because they were willing and available to participate in the 
study. A purposive sampling method was therefore used as the researcher’s focus 
was on those business units dealing with the policies and strategy planning and 
implementation. The researcher was highly intentional in the selection of 
respondents as only those respondents exposed to and working around the 
implementation of the NCPF were selected to participate in the study. A snowball 
sampling method was used as the researcher also interviewed respondents referred 




This section of the report will therefore provide an in-depth overview of the 
methodology and methods followed in this research with a point of departure being 
the explanation of the research approach and design which will be followed by an 
overview of the sampling strategy and then an in-depth explanation of the data 
gathering phase. 
 
3.2 Research Approach and Design 
 
This is a qualitative research design as the researcher “strives to create a coherent 
story as it is seen through the eyes of those who are part of that story…” (Wagner et 
al., 2012). The researcher’s intention was to gather the first account of data as 
information was being provided by the recipients, and as such, the researcher was 
the main source of data collection. Therefore the qualitative research design was 
chosen as the appropriate research methodology due to “… the richness and depth 
of explorations and descriptions of data” (Wagner, et al., 2012, p.126). 
 
This research is basic in its approach and it is motivated by the intellectual interests 
of the researcher in a phenomenon, it furthermore has as its main goals the 
extension of knowledge (Merran, 2009). The underlying objective of the research is 
to establish knowledge and understanding of the status and practice of cybersecurity 
in SA. The focus however, is on understanding the NCFP in terms of how effective it 
has been since implementation, if it has not been effective, to furthermore 
understand the factors which have contributed to it not achieving its main targets and 
finally to make recommendations on the effective implementation thereof.   
 
The unit of analysis for the purpose of this study is the policy, and more specifically 
its implementation process. The researcher studied and analysed the process of 
implementation of the NCPF. To do this, the researcher made use of the 5-C 
Protocol as a guiding model. The researcher intended studying the effective 
implementation of the policy framework and as the literature review outlined that 
there was a lack of an effective implementation thereof, the researcher then studied 
the barriers in the implementation of the said policy framework and finally made 
proposals on how to effectively implement the NCPF as well as other cybersecurity-




This research was based on the collection of primary data and therefore the 
researcher was the primary instrument in the data collection and analysis processes. 
This is because the researcher could expand the current knowledge and 
understanding through non-verbal as well as verbal communication, processes and 
analyse data immediately, clarify any uncertainties, checking with respondents for 
any clarity when uncertain and finally explore unusual or unanticipated responses 
(Merriam, 2009). The interactive nature of the method of data collection furthermore 
enabled the researcher to establish relations with respondents thereby creating an 
open and interactive research climate. This therefore enabled the researcher to 
establish on-going relationship with respondents so as to continually study and thus 
make contributions to the chosen study area.  
 
This research is mainly interpretative and highly inductive in its reasoning. Inductive 
reasoning is a form of reasoning whereby theory or the revision of theory is the 
outcome of the research, this therefore means that theory is drawn from the findings 
derived from data (Hewlett, 2015). This is a cross-sectional research as different 
samples are involved, separate in time, and the roles of the research was on 
identifying new factors or patters in the samples, to explore their effect in South 
African government departments (Ricttie and Lewis, 2003). 
 
This research was based in two forms, firstly on a national and strategic overview 
whereby the researcher focused on the available secondary data mainly unpacking 
the NCPF on a national level. This section is based on the process of 
implementation as per the proposed plan. The second part is based on the the 
DTPS. The researcher believes that the DTPS will be the accurate government 
department as it was given the mandate to implement the NCPF as much as the 
mandate was later on transferred to the SSA. The researcher focused on the three 
main responsibilities of the DTPS as mandated by the NCPF namely; the 
establishment of a Cybersecurity Hub, the rolling out of a Cybersecurity Awareness 
Programme and to assist sectors in the establishment of Sector CSIRTs.  
 
The researcher mainly asked the how and why questions and to avoid data 
saturation, the researcher used the literature to narrow the research interests to a 
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key topic or two, secondly the researcher examined closely a few key studies on the 
chosen topic of interest and finally identified the questions in those few studies to 
assess whether they conclude with new questions or loose ends for further research 
(Yin, 2014). Here the researcher consulted previous academic sources such as 
books, journal articles as well as scholarly research reports and dissertations.  
 
The researcher made use of semi-structured interviews whereby questions were 
prepared prior and based on addressing the overall research question. The chosen 
form of interviews was the personal, one-on-one interviews whereby the researcher 
interviewed the respondent in the comfort of their office. The researcher, in this 
instance, asked a set of questions from a questionnaire in the same order, using 
precisely the same wording and recorded the answers given by the respondent and 
each respondent was provided  (Wagner, et al., 2012). 
 
Before the data could be gathered, the researcher firstly obtained authorisation from 
the head of institution to conduct the research at the DTPS and thereafter all 
targeted respondents were approached and requested to participate in the study. 
The researchers’ ethics were highly crucial at this stage as the researcher asked the 
respondents to participate voluntarily in the study without expecting anything in 
return. What was promised by the researcher is the confidentiality of the responses 
should the respondents wish for their responses to be kept confidential as well as the 
copy of the findings once the research has been completed.  
 
The researcher therefore requested to make use of a boardroom within the DTPS 
premises. Appointments were arranged prior with all respondents and each 
appointment was reserved for only 20 minutes. Data collection was reserved for a 
period of two weeks, after the researcher had left the DTPS premises. The 
researcher spent the two week at the DTPS premises mainly conducting interviews 
as well reviewing all DTPS documents which were not reviewed during the literature 
review stage and thereafter returned to his offices to conduct data analysis. The 
researcher also made use of a cell phone to make recordings of all interviews, 
permission to record was requested from the respondents prior to commencing with 
the interview and the researcher only recoded the interview when permitted by the 
respondent. The recorded data was used entirely for analysis purposes and was 
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copied into a memory stick which is safely stored by the researcher. The data kept in 
the cell phone was deleted and the data kept in the memory stick will be deleted 
after one year of submission of this report.    
 
After the completion of the literature review and prior to the data collection phase, 
the researcher had already developed a proposition guided by the literature review. 
The proposition was that the NCPF has not been effectively implemented as per its 
intended plans. With this therefore, the researcher tailored the data collection plan in 
such a manner that it was directed at understanding what barriers are there in the 
implementation of the NCPF. This proposition was guided by various published 
authors which have been consulted at the literature review stage as well as by the 
observations made by the researcher in terms of the growing cybercrimes and 
related incidents in the previous 10 years, from 2005 to 2015.  
  
3.3 Description of the study area 
  
3.3.1 Sampling  
 
This is a purposive sampling process and the sampling frame was all the employees 
of the DTPS at the national office based in Pretoria. The reason for the choice of the 
head offices is that it is where all strategic and policy decisions are made and  as 
such the NCPF was handed to the officials based in that office,  these officials are in 
a better position to have more knowledge regarding the NCPF when compared to 
those in regional offices. The accessible population, as alluded to prior, was 
furthermore be scaled down so as to make it possible for the researcher to gather 
primary data within the required time-frame. The sample size was therefore a total of 
seven respondents of which only five were interviewed the remaining two was 
unavailable to participate in the study. The study used semi-structured, one-on-one 
interview as the method of data collection. 
 
The respondents were chosen from the business units which are working with the 
implementation of the NCPF namely the Cybersecurity Operations and the 
Cybersecurity Hub were also interviewed. Although currently stationed at the 
Cybersecurity Hub, these officials are accountable to the Chief Director: 
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Cybersecurity Operations who is in turn accountable to the DTPS Director General. 
These officials were responsible for the establishment of a Cybersecurity Hub, the 
rolling out of a cybersecurity awareness program, as well as the establishment of a 
platform of interaction for all stakeholders mandated to implement the NCPF.  
 
The researcher approached all seven respondents who all committed to assisting 
with the research, only five respondents were available to being interviewed. The two 
outstanding respondents could not attend the interview on the first week of the data 
collection due to official commitment. The researcher then made arrangements to 
return to the offices on the second week of which the researcher attempted 
unsuccessfully for the entire week to secure appointments with the two outstanding 
respondents as they had busy schedules. The researcher then requested the 
respondents to contact him whenever they are available of which they did not. 
Furthermore, the researcher attempted to contact the respondents on week three, 
this was also an unsuccessful exercise. The researcher also requested an 
intervention from the Chief Director: Cybersecurity who was also unsuccessful. With 
this therefore, the researcher analysed the collected data and drew conclusions as a 
large proportion of the targeted audience responded to the interviews. Out of a total 
of seven respondents, five were interviewed and two were unavailable.     
 
A non-probability sampling strategy was used as the “respondents were included in 
the sample because they are willing and available to participate in the study” 
(Wagner, et al., 2012). A non-probability sampling strategy was furthermore used as 
the researcher’s focus was on those departments dealing with the policies and 
strategy planning and implementation. A purposive sampling method was used. The 
researcher, in this instance, relied on previous research or ingenuity about the 
respondents to find participants in such a manner that they can be considered to be 
representatives of the population and usually uses specific criteria to identify the 
most suitable individuals (Wagner, et al., 2012). The criteria in this regard were 
based on their exposure and knowledge of the NCPF.  
 
A snowball sampling method was another method used by the researcher as 
members of the population were difficult to locate (Wagner, et al., 2012). The 
researcher in this instance was referred to other members within the DTPS who 
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were interested in the study and were believed to possibly positively contribute 
thereto. Initially, the researcher met one official from the Cybersecurity Operations 
who introduced the researcher to two officials from the same unit. One official from 
the Cybersecurity Operations, then introduced the researcher to an official at the 
Cybersecurity Hub who in turn introduced the researcher to three other officials at 
the Cybersecurity Hub. The total number of respondents was therefore five who 
were all interviewed by the researcher on a face-to-face basis. Three of these 
officials are based at the DTPS head offices in Hartfield, Pretoria and the remainder 
are based at the Cybersecurity Hub which is located at the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research’s (CSIR) offices in Pretoria.  
 
3.3.2  Secondary Data 
 
Secondary data is as important as primary data in any given research. As much as 
this research was based on the collection of primary data, the researcher also relied 
on secondary data. Secondary data has got the capability of exposing the researcher 
to the NCPF in its core, its implementation plan, the key stakeholders and role-
players, the status of implementation and finally its successes and failures since 
implementation until recently.  
 
The researcher approached secondary data in various phases. The first phase was 
to read and critically analyse the NCPF, this was done in an effort aimed at 
establishing an extensive understanding of the policy framework. Phase 2 involved 
the reviewing of all key policies in line with the NCPF, all policies listed alongside the 
policy framework were extensively reviewed, an example is the Cybercrimes and 
Cyber Security Bill, Electronic Communication Amendment Act, IM Act,  POPI Act as 
well as other policies regarded as closely related to the NCPF.  
 
Phase 3 consisted of the reviewing of all academic sources such as academic 
journals, books and all publications with a focus on the policy framework which the 
researcher came into contact with. This phase also consisted of the reviewing of all 
essential DTPS documents related to the DTPS, both internal and external DTPS 
documents were reviewed at this stage. Once all the phases were thoroughly 
undertaken, the researcher compiled a report which focused directly on the chosen 
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research area and thus provided direction and assistance in the data collection 
stage.  
 
The researcher chose the secondary data to take this form as the cybersecurity field 
is fairly new in the South African context and there are therefore very few 
publications more specifically with the NCPF. The researcher is of the view that the 
choice of approaching research in this manner will expose the researcher to 
important data in an orderly form as this will be in a chronological order starting from 
2005 to 2015. Most sources referred to in the literature review were able to provide 
the researcher with an extensive overview which was able to assist in developing the 
overall research questions as well as the interview questions used during the data 
gathering phase.     
 
The following questions were used as guidelines when reviewing secondary data: 
 What was the status of the SA cyberspace in 2005? 
 How has the status of the cyberspace been since 2005 until 2015? 
 How vulnerable is the SA cyberspace to cybercrime and all related incidents? 
 What policies are in place to safeguard the SA cyberspace? 
 What is the scope and focus of the NCPF? 
 Who are the key custodians in the NCPF? 
 How effective has the NCPF been since implementation? 
 Are there any barriers and/or enablers in the implementation of the NCPF? 
 What is the status of the SA cybersecurity since the implementation of the 
NCPF? 
 What policies are currently in place at the DTPS in relation to the NCPF? 
   
3.4 Data Analysis 
 
A deductive approach of analysis was used during this research as the researcher 
was already familiar with the codes and therefore aimed to confirm or explain a 
phenomenon, based on several cases (Wagner et al., 2012). The researcher used 
codes which have already been identified from various studies conducted in the 
chosen research area. These codes have already been gathered during the literature 
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review stage and therefore were used as key words both in data collection as well as 
in data analysis. Deductive analysis according to Wagner et al (2012) calls for 
looking at the study from a general standpoint, then moving to the specific data 
gathered.  
 
The researcher started conducting data analysis during the data gathering phase as 
this enabled the researcher to analyse the data as soon as it was received thereby 
ensuring the accurately thereof. With this practice, the researcher developed growing 
attention to analysis in proportion to the amount of data being collected and as soon 
as all the data was collected, the researcher then set aside a period of intensive 
analysis, this was when tentative findings were substantiated, revised and 
reconfigured (Merran, 2009). This practice enabled the researcher to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the data being gathered, it also limited the 
possibility of an error with regards to the accuracy of the data post analysis.   
 
Thematic analysis is an analysis approach which was used by the researcher. This is 
an approach which involves identifying themes or patterns in the data with an 
intention of understanding some phenomenon by looking at how various participants 
experience the phenomenon (Wagner, et al., 2012) with an intention of answering 
the research question. The researcher in this instance wanted to understand some 
phenomenon by studying how various participants experienced a phenomenon and 
thus address the problem statement (Wagner, et al., 2012).When studying the 
responses gathered during the data gathering phase, the researcher identified units 
of analysis which were words, phrases and sentences that were mentioned by the 
respondents during the interviews, and labelled them with a code. Boyatzis in 
Wagner et al (2012) stated that a good code has got five elements, namely; a label, 
a definition of what the code concern, a description of how to know when the code 
occurred, a description of the qualifications and exclusion to the code and the listing 
of examples both positive and negative, to avoid confusion.    
 
As soon as the researcher concluded with all interviews, the researcher first 
transcribed the interview in order to identify units of analysis which can be a word, 
phrase, sentence or couple of sentences and thereafter identified the topic being 
discussed or the subject of the unit. The transcribed interviews are presented in 
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chapter 5 of this research report. As each unit was being read, it was be labelled with 
a code. Thereafter the code were marked in the margins of a clean A4 paper and 
also highlighted with different colours, different codes had different colours. As soon 
as the codes were identified, the researcher then defined all the codes in order to 
illustrate what would be an appropriate entry for each code (Wagner, et al., 2012). 
Here, the researcher ensured that all elements of a code were included in a code.  
 
Furthermore, a constant comparison method was also introduced. This was when 
the researcher compared new pieces of data with previous codes and labelled them 
with codes identified from the literature review (Wagner, et al., 2012). Once the first 
interview was concluded, the researcher moved to all interviews in the similar 
manner. Following this stage, the researcher then grouped the codes into categories 
of meaning. The researcher ensured that the categories were exclusive and 
therefore incorporates all key elements in the subject of the study. These categories 
were tailored in such a manner that they are mutually exclusive in the sense that 
each unit will be different to another and only fit into one category and thus reflect 
the same level of abstraction. Finally, these codes were selected in terms of how 
accurately they address the three overall research questions which guided the study.    
 
 
3.5 Validity and Reliability 
 
Reliability and validity are two concepts of critical importance in any given research. 
Reliability estimates the consistency of a measurement and validity involves the 
degree to which the researcher measures what they are required to measure 
(Wagner et al., 2012). To keep in tune and to be in line with the research, the 
researcher applied the concept of validity in research. Once the data was gathered, 
the researcher compared the findings with the published literature which was 
reviewed in Chapter to with an intention of either making connections or any 
disputing factors if they existed, a concept known as content validity. 
 
This was the only element of validity which could be applied by the researcher as 
there was limited time to study the situation over time. The researcher will however, 
apply practices such as criterion validity which compares the measurement tool with 
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the relevant content (Wagner et al., 2012) as well as construct validity which will look 
at the extent to which the operationalization of the construct taps into actual theories 
(Wagner et al., 2012). These measures will however be applied at a later stage, as 
much as the report will be submitted for assessment purposes. The researcher will 
then arrange follow-up visits to the DTPS wherein a follow-up study will be 
conducted to first ascertain the effectiveness of the recommendations as well as to 
assist going forward.     
  
3.6 Risk associated with the study 
 
When planning for the research, the researcher was aware of a number of possible 
risks which if not planned for might interfere with the entire research process. The 
researcher pre-empted for the risks and then planned the countermeasures 
accordingly. The following section will provide an outline of the perceived risks as 
well as their counter-measures. The researcher in this instance identified four  risks 
which will be associated with this particular study, counter-measures were also 
provided and as such the researcher planned ahead  and therefore was not caught 
off-guard during the data gathering phase.     
There was a possibility of respondents choosing not to participate in the study. To 
counter this risk, the researcher requests the office of the Director General to send 
the letter of request to the Chief Director of the targeted business unit. This made it 
much easier for the researcher when approaching the respondents as an 
endorsement was already given by the head of the institution and as such the letter 
of request was filtered down from the highest office in the DTPS. This procedure 
worked effectively and the researcher was well received and was able to effectively 
collect data as projected.   
When requested by the Chief Director: Cybersecurity to participate in the study, all 
respondents agreed to assist the researcher, however, in the absence of the Chief 
Director, only five respondents participated in the study. The two outstanding 
respondents did not participate as they had busy schedules. The researcher 
therefore analysed the collected data as a larger proportion of the respondents had 
participated on the study and therefore conclusions were drawn on the findings 
gathered. There still exists a possibility that the outstanding respondents might have 
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provided different information of which might have affected the research findings, the 
outstanding respondents will be engaged when the researcher submits a copy to the 
department.  
There was a possibility that the target institution only implemented few NCPF 
proposals as the mandate was later given to SSA and as such the officials could 
have limited information with regards to the subject area. To avert this risk, the 
researcher had prior engagements with officials from the SSA structures and they 
have confirmed that the DTPS plays a critical role in the implementation of the 
NCPF. There are however, a selected number of officials who are responsible for the 
functions related to the NCPF, it then became the responsibility of the researcher to 
ensure that the correct respondents are approached and that they agree to 
participate in the study. 
The possibility of biasness and data saturation which might lead to skewed 
responses. Biasness was highly possible as the target audiences are from a single 
organisation and the subject of research is a policy which was at a later stage taken 
away from the organisation. Data saturation was highly possible as there are only 
few individuals currently working on the implementation of the NCPF and as such, it 
was rather challenging to gather data from a handful number of people. The 
researcher then tried to approach as much respondents as possible.  
There was a possibility that respondents might provide incorrect information either 
deliberately or unintentionally when they were unfamiliar with the subject. To counter 
this risk, the researcher reserved a period of two weeks to spend in the DTPS for 
data collection. Ideally, all five respondents were interviewed within one week and as 
such, the researcher used the remaining week to verify any points of uncertainty and 
verified conflicting information. The researcher also used this remaining time to meet 
with those respondents who had more information to provide to the researcher as 
well as those who had more clarity seeking questions.  
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
 
The researcher’s aim was to conduct the research in an ethical manner as studies 
which are not designed with care may unintentionally harm the participants. The 
researcher, in this instance clearly communicated the methodology, purpose of the 
62 
 
research, and any risk and benefits that may arise for the participants during the 
research process (Wagner et al., 2012). The researcher established an open and 
interactive relationship with all respondents thereby ensuring that all uncertainties by 




First and foremost, the researcher sent a letter requesting to conduct the research to 
the Director General who then filtered the letter down to the Chief Director: 
Cybersecurity. In the letter, the researcher fully outlined the purpose of the research, 
scope of the research, duration of the research as well as what the needs are from 
the organisation. Once the permission was granted, various Directors of targeted 
business units were approached. The purpose here was to request the Directors to 
allow the researcher the space to conduct the research as well as to allow the 
respondents’ time to participate in the study as the data was mainly gathered during 
official hours unless otherwise requested by a respondent. As soon as the research 
has been completed and the report has been compiled, the researcher will make the 





 This research is solely academic in nature, with the ultimate goal being the 
compilation of a research report for the Masters programme. The researcher 
honestly outlined, to the respondents, the purpose of the research as well as the only 
benefit of participating in the study which will be to be provided with a research 
report. The researcher did not make any promises to the respondents as the 
researcher was fully aware that those promises will never be materialised. The 
researcher therefore explained to the respondents that the purpose thereof is for the 
completion of the Masters Degree and therefore the respondents were only assisting 
the researcher with a motive of adding value to the research report by providing the 





3.7.3 Informed Consent   
  
 The researcher designed an informed consent document which explained to all 
respondents, the scope, duration, purpose, confidentiality and anonymity of the 
research, prior to an interview and if accepted, it was signed by the respondents. 
The researcher only proceeded with the research after the informed consent was 
signed. If the respondents were dissatisfied with the informed consent and therefore 
chose not to sign it, the research then could not proceed with the research. The 
respondents also afforded the respondents an opportunity to add any aspects which 
deemed necessary for the completion of the research, this was only accepted if it is 
in line with the research.  
 
3.7.4 Anonymity and confidentiality  
 
 When compiling the research report, the researcher did not refer to the respondents 
in their original names. The respondents were referred to as; Respondent 01, 
Respondent 02, Respondent 03, Respondent 04 and Respondent 05. During an 
interview, respondents were afforded an opportunity to introduce themselves, if at 
any chance, they did not feel comfortable with their names being known, and they 
were referred to in professional means namely Mam or Sir”. As outlined earlier in the 
proposal, the researcher also utilised cell phone to record the interview. The 
utilisation thereof depended on how comfortable the respondent was in the process 






This section of the report has outlined in detail how the researcher went about 
collecting data. This research report clearly unpacked the research methodology, 
research design and the method of data collection. This research is a qualitative 
research with semi-structured interviews as the methods of data collection. The 
researcher chose the qualitative research design as a researcher intended to 
collecting data through the usage of qualitative methods of data collection.  Semi-
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structured interviews were used as a method of data collection and as such, the 
researcher arranged 20minute interviews with the respondents before the actual 
data gathering stage.  
This section then unpacked the sampling frame and strategy followed. The sampling 
frame for this research is a non-probability sampling frame with a purposive sampling 
being used as a method of sampling, a snowball sampling method was also used as 
the researcher also relied on referrals for respondents to interview. The researcher 
chose this method as the selection of respondents was directed at only those 
respondents who have either worked with or are currently working with the 
implementation of the NCPF. Furthermore, the researcher only chose those 
respondents who were both available and willing to participate in the study without 
expecting anything in return.  
This section also referred to the importance of secondary data, which was seen as of 
importance as it has the capability of providing background information on the 
subject are as well as assisting in the formulation of research questions. The 
reviewing of and consultation of secondary data was approached, by the researcher 
in various stages as outlined in this report. When reviewing secondary data, the 
researcher was guided by various questions which provided solid background and 
narrowed the focus of the reviewing of secondary data.  
The researcher then, in this section provided an overview of the method and 
approach of data analysis. The method of coding was used by the researcher as the 
method of data analysis. Here information obtained was categorised in various 
themes and codes of analysis. This was a method which assisted the research in 
fully analysing the research findings and ultimately in coming up with conclusions 
and therefore making recommendations which will be communicated to all 
stakeholders who were involved in the research.  
The last part of this section looked into the aspect of reliability and validity which was 
followed by ethical considerations. The former refers to the researcher’s adherence 
to the research ethical considerations which the researcher ensured that there was 
strict adherence thereto. With regards to ethical consideration, the researcher 
adhered strictly to the ethical aspects covered in this section which include 
gatekeeping, deception, informed consent, and anonymity and confidentiality. Above 
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all, the researcher at all times, strived to being honest and displayed integrity 




























Chapter four defines the NCPF as a government owned policy document which 
recognises that the state is charged with implementing a government led, coherent 
and integrated cybersecurity approach (State Security Agency, 2012).  This section 
furthermore outlines the scope, purpose, focus and structure of the policy proposal 
as approved in March 2012. This section outlines the key objectives of the NCPF 
which includes amongst others, the centralisation of cybersecurity activities through 
the establishment of relevant structures and policy frameworks in support of 
cybersecurity.  
 
This section then moves on to explaining the NCPF mandate changes which 
occurred after the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the report outlines the role of 
the JCPS cluster with regards to the NCPF in conjunction with government 
departments, which entails the overseeing of the implementation of the NCPF with 
the aim of ensuring a centralised approach in coordinating cybersecurity. This role is 
however made possible with the assistance of SSA as the lead department in the 
implementation of the policy proposal. This chapter then outlines the structure and 
component of the policy proposal with the SSA being the lead department and the 
JCPS cluster playing the oversight role.  
  
This section furthermore outlines the purpose of a dedicated JCPS Cybersecurity 
Response Centre (CRC) which will be established within the JCPS Cluster with the 
intension of coordinating cybersecurity activities. This section also makes mention of 
the Cybersecurity Centre (CSC), Cybersecurity Hub, Electronic Communications 
Security Computer Security Incident Response Teams (ECS-CSIRT) and other 
CSIRT establishments in SA. The report then fully explains the roles and 
responsibilities of the CSIRTs within the South African context as established 




This section then outlines the stakeholders involved in the implementation of the 
NCPF alongside their roles and responsibilities. The role-players outlined are; 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJ&CD), SSA, The South 
African Police Services (SAPS), DTPS, The Department of Defence and Military 
Veterans (DoD&MV), The Department of Science and Technology (DoST), the 
private sector and civil society. It is furthermore stated in this section that, for the 
effective implementation of the NCPF, all these department should adhere to the 
proposals as outlined in the NCPF. Although not mentioned alongside these 
stakeholders, the JCPS is the key role-player who is mandated with the role of 
overseeing the implementation thereof.   
Finally, this section furthermore outlines the key elements involved in the 
implementation of the NCPF which are closely linked to the 5-C protocol. The factors 
which will be outlined involved: Political will; Established strictures (Capacity); The 
reduction of criminal opportunities and the increasing level of difficulties faced by the 
criminal; To encourage, lead and coordinate the education of professionals in the 
legal, economic and political arenas (Context and Capacity); The availability of 
trained staff and other resources (Capacity and Commitment); and a thorough 
understanding of the cultural and governmental differences (Capacity, Clients and 
Coalitions). Once all the factors are achieved, it is believed by the researcher that a 













4.2 The NCPF  
 
The NCPF promotes a cybersecurity culture and demands compliance with minimum 
standards, strengthens intelligence collection, investigation, prosecution and judicial 
processes, it establishes public-private partnerships for national and international 
action plans, it ensures the protection of national critical information infrastructure 
and it promotes and ensures a comprehensive legal framework governing 
cyberspace (State Security Agency, .2012). 
The rationale behind the national cybersecurity policy framework is to enable the 
safekeeping of a nations’ constituency and the associated organisational, human, 
financial, technological and informational resources (Grobler et al., 2007, p.1). With 
this therefore, the South African government through the DTPS approved the NCPF 
in 2012. According to the SSA Minister, Mr Mahlobo, SSA, in line with the NCPF, 
plans to “prioritise the establishment of cybersecurity centres and the repositioning of 
the current ECS-CSIRT to become a government CSIRT as securing that South 
Africa will ensure conditions of peace, security and development are enhanced 
(State Security Agency,2015).  
To achieve its objectives, the NCPF will ensure the centralisation of cybersecurity 
activities through the establishment of relevant structures and policy frameworks in 
support of cybersecurity; it will foster co-operation between government, private 
sector and civil society through policy legislation and technology; it will promote 
international co-operation; it will develop requisite skills, research and develop 
capacity; it will promote a culture of cybersecurity and will promote compliance with 
appropriate technical and operational cybersecurity standards (State Security 
Agency, .2012). 
SSA chairs the Cybersecurity Response Committee (CRC), a strategic body 
responsible for cybersecurity priority setting and overseeing the implementation of 
the NCPF once established (State Security Agency, 2015). Minister Mahlobo, in the 
2015 budget vote speech also informed the general population of plans to strengthen 
the currently established cybersecurity initiatives such as the ECS-CSIRT. This is by 
means of making them fully capacitated and readily available to respond to any 
perceived threat and risk to the cyberspace.    
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The Systematic Corporation in 2013 published that cybercrime is increasing at a 
much rapid rate in Africa than in any other area in the world, and as such, expects 
estimate that 80% of personal computers in Africa are infected with a virus or other 
malicious software (United Nations, 2014). Africa and in particular South Africa has 
recently seen an explosive growth in Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT), making cybercrime to grow at a significant rate. There are, according to 
Globler et al (2007) Limited or inadequate actions and controls to protect computers 
and networks thereby making Africa a target of attack as well as a medium to attack 
other parts of the world.  
The South African JCPS Cluster has adopted the NCPF as part of its mandate and 
obligations under Outcome three/Output Seven (Pieterse, 2015). The NCPF is aimed 
at providing a holistic approach and will be supported by the national cybersecurity 
plan. It seeks measures aimed at addressing national security threats in terms of 
cyberspace, at promoting the combating of cybercrime and trust in the secure of ITC; 
at developing , renewing and updating substation and procedural laws to ensure 
alignment (Pieterse, 2015). It is furthermore aimed at reducing the cybersecurity 
threats and risks with the ultimate aim of securing the South African Cyberspace.  
According to the Pieterse (2015), the JCPS Cluster in conjunction with government 
departments is mandated with the function of overseeing the implementation of the 
NCPF with the aim of ensuring a centralised approach in coordinating cybersecurity 
measures. The JCPS CRC chaired by SSA, has been established to oversee the 
implementation of Output Seven also supported by the CSC. To fulfil this obligation, 
the JCPS cluster established the JCPS implementation plan which was established 
with the main aim of providing a monitoring plan, with deadlines used to monitor the 
progress made in the implementation of the goals and objectives as outlined in the 
NCPF.  
The NCPF, according to Otoom and Atoum in Globler et al (2007) uses a strategic 
planning process consisting of the strategic formulation, strategic implementation 
and evaluation as its main strategy. The elements of the NCPF are; a detailed 
analysis of the policy strategy in manageable and understandable parts, a 
manageable structure responsible for the implementation of the strategy, strategic 
moves designed to achieve the different strategic goals and a set of applicable 
70 
 
strategic controls which should be deployed (Grobler et al., 2007). The main 
responsibilities of all stakeholders within the NCPF are therefore to ensure that the 
all the strategic elements of the NCPF are fully implemented and thus operational. 
To ensure the coordination of and effective working relations among all stakeholders, 
as per the 5-C Protocol.      
The NCPF sets out the national cybersecurity proposals outlining the government 
approach to addressing cybercrimes and related incidents. It is aimed at 
implementing an all-encompassing approach pertaining to all role-players in relations 
to cybersecurity. The key strategic objectives of the NCPF are; to facilitate the 
establishment of relevant structures in support of cybersecurity; to ensure the 
reduction of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities to foster co-operation and 
coordination between the government and private sector; to promote and strengthen 
international cooperation on cybersecurity; to build capacity and promote a culture of 
cybersecurity; and to promote compliance with appropriate technical and operational 
cybersecurity standards (Grobler et al., 2007). 
 
4.3 Structure of the NCPF   
Approved in March 2012, the NCPF identifies areas of responsibility by a number of 
government departments with SSA being the key custodian (Grobler et al., 2007). It 
is worth noting at this point that the JCPS Cluster, in consultation with specific 
government departments involved in cybersecurity, oversees the implementation of 
the proposals outlined in the NCPF. According to the NCPF, a dedicated JCPS CRC 
is established within the JCPS Cluster with the intension of coordinating 
cybersecurity activities, to drive the implementation of the NCPF and to manage the 
implementation of Output Seven (State Security Agency, 2012).      
Closely linked to the capacity aspect of the 5-C protocol, the role of the CRC is 
amongst others to ensure the achievement of NCPF policy objectives; to coordinate 
cybersecurity activities and to be a central point of contact on all cybersecurity 
matters of national interest; to identify and promote areas of intervention and 
promote focused attention and guidance where required; to promote, guide and 
coordinate activities aimed at improving cybersecurity measures by all role players; 
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and to oversee and guide the functioning of the CSC, Cybersecurity Hub, South 
African Government ECS-CSIRT and other CSIRT establishments in SA (State 
Security Agency, 2012).  
4.4 Cybersecurity Hub and CSIRT’s   
The Cybersecurity Hub was established by the DTPS with an intension of 
establishing a platform of facilitating interaction between key role players involved in 
cybersecurity. The Cybersecurity Hub is therefore a platform that coordinates the 
interaction between the JCPS cluster, government departments, private sector and 
civil societies on matters related to cybersecurity. With regards to the analytical 
framework, this factor is linked to the clients and coalitions. This is a platform 
established as per the NCPF, whereby all cybersecurity incidents are reported and 
interventions by relevant role-players are made to counter all threats and risks 
against the cyberspace.   
The responsibilities of the Cybersecurity Hub, as outlined in the NCPF includes; to 
coordinate cybersecurity activities in consultation with JCPS CRC as well as 
stakeholders in the private and public sector; to disseminate relevant information to 
other sector CSIRTs, vendors, technology experts on cybersecurity; to provide best 
practice guidance on ICT security for government, businesses and civil society; to 
initiate cybersecurity awareness campaigns; and to encourage and facilitate the 
development of appropriate additional sector CSIRT (State Security Agency, 2012). 
The CSIRT, according to Grobler et al (2007) consists of a team of dedicated 
information security specialists that prepares for and responds to any information 
security incident. The CSIRT was established based on the premise that developing 
countries such as SA do not have proper skills and organisations in relation to 
cybersecurity incidents and as such, they are vulnerable and a major risk for other 
countries as well (Grobler et al., 2015). The establishment of the CSIRT in SA is 
mainly based on the increasing threats and risks against the vulnerable cyberspace. 
The stakeholders in the CSRITs are fully equipped with the necessary skills required 
to counter any cyber security threats and risks.   
According to Grobler et al (2010) a CSIRT consist of a team of dedicated information 
security specialists and as such when an incident occurs, the members of a CSIRT 
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can assist its constituency in determining what happened and what actions need to 
be taken to remedy the situation. The officials can furthermore immediately report 
any cybercrime incident to law enforcement agents and an investigation can 
immediately be conducted. As a CSIRT is a 24 hour point of contact whereby 
cybersecurity incidents can be reported as they occur, all stakeholders mandated to 
form part of the CSIRT as per the NCPF, are required to be available on an on-going 
basis and respond to any cybersecurity incident as it occurs.  
Figure 1 below consists of general services rendered by a CSIRT in any given 
country such as SA. According to the table below, the CSIRT consists of both 
proactive and reactive services. The proactive services mainly consist of services 
related to the general monitoring of cyberspace and therefore countering any cyber-
crime from manifesting. The reactive services are often those which occur after an 
incident has occurred such as incident response and analysis. The main goal of a 
CSIRT is the rendering of proactive services.   
 





4.5 Stakeholders in the NCPF 
There are various stakeholders which are mandated to form part in the 
implementation of the NCPF. All stakeholders mandated as per the NCPF play a 
critical role in the implementation thereof and ultimately the securing of the 
cyberspace. This section will provide an outline of all such stakeholders.  
The DoJ&CD is mandated, as per the NCPF, to lead the implementation process, in 
consultation with the JCPS cluster for the review and alignment of cyber laws and is 
required to submit progress reports to the cluster on a continuous basis and in 
accordance with the JCPS implementation plan (State Security Agency, 2012). 
Simply stated, its role is to ensure that all laws are aligned with the policy framework 
and create an integrated cybercrime legal framework and prosecution in the country. 
Therefore, the DoJ&CD must ensure that all security laws do not overlook the 
importance of the cyberspace and thus take into consideration the proposals made 
in line with the NCPF.  
SSA is mandated to take the overall responsibility and accountability for the 
coordination, development and implementation of cybersecurity measures in the 
country (State Security Agency, 2012). SSA is mandated to ensure that the JCPS 
cluster is fully capacitated and well able to carry out its duties; to ensure the 
establishment of the CRC, cybersecurity centres and the proper existence of the 
CSIRTs; to initiate and lead a process for the development and approval of 
guidelines and national security norms and standards; and to provide information 
assurance and secure information and communication technology of importance in 
support of national security. Simply stated, SSA is the key role-player mandated with 
the overall implementation of the NCPF, this however, does not give SSA more 
superiority over other stakeholders as all departments listed in this sections each 
have got a huge role to play in the effective implementation of the NCPF.   
The SAPS, in terms of the NCPF, is responsible for the prevention, investigation, 
and combating of cybercrime in the country; the roles of SAPS includes; the 
development of cybercrime policies and strategies; the collaboration with appropriate 
stakeholders; the development and maintenance of enforcement capabilities and the 
impartment of basic understanding of cybercrime within SAPS. The SAPS, through 
the Cybercrimes bill, has the responsibility of developing policies aimed at curbing 
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and reducing cybercrime. Furthermore, SAPS has the power to make arrest if an 
individual or institution is alleged to have committed a cybercrime or related incident.  
The DTPS is responsible for the development and implementation of policies, 
regulations and industry standards regarding ICT in general and to assist in the 
provision of strategic direction and coordination on local and international 
cybersecurity measures (State Security Agency, 2012). The DTPS is also 
responsible for the establishment of the National Cybersecurity Advisory Council 
(NCAC) which is responsible for advising the minister of the Telecommunications 
and Postal Services on policy and technical issues as well as other matters related 
to cybersecurity (State Security Agency, 2012). Finally, the DTPS is also responsible 
for the establishment of the cybersecurity hub as well as the facilitation of any other 
sector CSIRT. The researcher therefore tested the progress made by the DTPS in 
terms of its responsibilities in the implementation of the NCPF, this was done in a 
form of a case study which is reported on in the latter part of the report.   
The DoD&MV has the sole responsibility for the coordination, accountability and 
implementation of cyber defence measures in SA as an integral part of its national 
defence mandate (State Security Agency, 2012). The DoD&MV furthermore has got 
the role of border security as per its mandate and therefore, it is also responsible to 
ensure defensive security in that regard. With that therefore, the DoD&MV is 
furthermore mandated to establish secure cyber defence measures to protect the 
South African territory from adversaries from foreign countries, both internationally 
and regionally. Furthermore, the DoD&MV must be able to advise all stakeholders 
accordingly should a threat arise specifically from outside the perimeters of the 
country.  
The DoST has the responsibility of the development, coordination and 
implementation of the national capacity development program, furthermore, it is 
responsible for developing and facilitating the implementation of the national 
cybersecurity research and development agenda for South Africa (State Security 
Agency, 2012). The DoST has got the responsibility of assisting other role-players 
within the cyberspace in developing innovative cybersecurity hardware and software 
which will assist in making the South African cyberspace more secure. The role of 
the DoST is therefore to constantly conduct research and thus provide advisory 
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service on an on-going basis with an aim of positioning the South African 
Cyberspace in a more secure space.       
The private sector and civil society are also key role players with regards to the 
NCPF. The former is responsible for the implementation of information security 
measures which are equivalent to those implemented in government departments. 
The latter is required to ensure that each and every computer, cell phone or any 
other device at their disposal connected to an internet is protected by a sufficient 
malware protection which is fully functional and constantly updated. Furthermore, 
these role-players also have the responsibility of reporting any cybersecurity incident 
as it arises to the national CSIRT or any other sector CSIRT. Figure 2 below consist 
of an organogram outlining the role-players involved in cybersecurity (Grobler et al., 
2007). This organogram only outline key stakeholders as per the NCPF mandate 
namely; SSA and DTPS with the JCPS cluster providing an oversight role. This 
organogram furthermore outlines the structures which these departments mandated 
to establish in the process of implementing the NCPF.    
 







4.6 Critical Elements in the implementation of the NCPF  
 
Approved in 2012, the NCPF was intended to be implemented according to the 
JCPS implementation plan. This section of the research report will unpack the key 
elements required in the implementation of one of the proposals outlined in the 
NCPF, specifically the Cybersecurity Hub, also known as the CSIRT. In an effort 
aimed at making the research more researchable and therefore practical, the 
researcher chose to conduct field work at the DTPS. As per the NCPF, the DTPS is 
responsible for the implementation of the cybersecurity hub and as such, the 
researcher, when conducting research focused on analysing whether the DTPS was 
successful in its goals of establishing a cybersecurity hub and if it was not, the 
researcher therefore unpacked the barrier in implementation.   
This section of the report will therefore unpack some of the elements required in 
successfully implementing a CSIRT.  The 5-C protocol outlined and the following 
elements will be followed by the researcher when analysing the status of 
implementation of the NCPF. The results of the research conducted will be outlined 
in the following chapter.  
First and foremost, political will is required when implementing a CSIRT. The 
national leadership, according to Grobler et al (2007) is highly imperative as both an 
individual and an organisational relationship is required in ensuring the effectiveness 
of cybersecurity policies. The NCPF is as such aimed at ensuring that various 
government departments and the private sector participate in ensuring the security of 
the cyberspace. Senior political leaders as they are the most prominent figures in the 
leadership of a country such as SA are required to first understand the objectives of 
any given policy and as such endorse a policy because their assistance is required 
in all aspects both financially and non-financially.     
Secondly, there should be established strictures which should sustain effective 
cybersecurity solutions for individuals, organisations and government agencies 
(Grobler et al., 2007). A CSIRT can as such be considered the most prominent 
organisational structure in the coordination of computer networks and information 
systems. It is also of utmost importance to identify accurate proactive and reactive 
measures as individuals and groups are highly dependent on data (Grobler et al., 
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2007). Ghernouti in Grobler et al (2007). proposed that cybersecurity actors should 
be classified in specific roles such as the protector, protected, or the criminal, this will 
make it much easier to identify any threats thereto and as such, the multiplicity and 
automation of cybersecurity is becoming more prominent to maximise output and 
minimise the element of human error.  
The third element should be the reduction of criminal opportunities which should be 
perceived as an effective measure which will be made possible by the effective 
implementation of the NCPF. The foundation for an adequate security system 
according to Grobler et al (2007) is twofold: to raise the level of risk taken by a 
criminal as well as to raise the level of difficulties faced by the criminal. The ultimate 
goal of cybersecurity measures is to ultimately reduce cybercrimes and related 
incidences, this might take longer to achieve, therefore while working towards 
achieving the goal, cybersecurity measure must therefore achieve the two objectives 
listed above.  
Organisations, both private and public, should also encourage, lead and coordinate 
the education of professionals in the legal, economic and political arenas in an effort 
aimed at strengthening cybersecurity in various aspects. The lack of cybersecurity 
awareness has been seen as one of the factors which are contributing to the 
increasing vulnerabilities in the cyberspace. Some of the cyber users fall prey to 
cybercriminals as they unwillingly give information to cybercriminals which they are 
often not aware that such information is sensitive and as such it can be used to 
commit cybercrime. It is therefore of outmost importance that organisations involved 
in cybersecurity establish programs which will assist in the uplifting and development 
of the cyber awareness.   
The availability of trained staff and other resources is also seen as a key element in 
the effective implementation of the NCPF. Oftentimes, the activities involved in the 
NCPF involve professional expertise and as such, it is crucial that that those people 
involved in these projects possess those skills or are trained immediately after they 
are hired (Grobler et al., 2010). According to Grobler at al (2010) excellent IT 
knowledge and the willingness to learn new things are good characters in the 
recruitment process with regards to officials who will be implementing the 
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recommendations as outlined in the NCPF namely the establishment of the 
cybersecurity hub.   
Finally, it is also of importance that all role-players involved in the implementation of 
the recommendations outlined in the NCPF have a thorough understanding of the 
cultural and governmental differences within the country as well as among various 
countries both internationally and regionally. A good understanding of various inter-
governmental policies and mandates will give government departments an ability not 
to overstep other terrains and as such to make a certain department to operate 
within its mandate. Internationally, it is also of importance to fully understand the 
governmental difference as “Cultural backgrounds and working environments may 




The section above has outlined the NCPF in terms of its objectives, structure and 
purpose as approved in March 2012. This section of the report also outlined the key 
objectives of the NCPF which included amongst others, the centralisation of 
cybersecurity activities through the establishment of relevant structures and policy 
frameworks in support of cybersecurity. Furthermore, this section also defined the 
NCPF as a government owned policy document which recognises that the state is 
charged with implementing a government led, coherent and integrated cyber security 
approach (State Security Agency, 2012). 
 
The research report outlined the NCPF mandate changes which occurred after the 
implementation in 2012. This section furthermore, outlined SSA as the key custodian 
of the NCPF, the JCPS cluster as the overseer of the policy framework, the DoJ&CD 
as mandated to lead in terms of the review and alignment of cyber laws and is 
required to submit progress reports to the cluster on a continuous basis; SSA is 
mandated to take the overall responsibility and accountability for the coordination, 
development and implementation of cybersecurity measures in the country; SAPS is 
responsible for the prevention, investigation, and combating of cybercrime in the 
country; the DTPS is responsible for the development and implementation of 
policies, regulations and industry standards regarding ICT in general; the DoD&MV 
79 
 
has the sole responsibility for the coordination, accountability and implementation of 
cyber defence; and the DoST has the responsibility of the development, coordination 
and implementation of the national capacity development program 
The private sector and civil society have got the responsibility of abiding to the 
transcripts as set out in the NCPF.  Finally, this section furthermore outlined the key 
elements involved in the implementation of the NCPF, which involved among others, 
political will, trained officials etc. A conclusion was therefore drawn by the researcher 
that these key elements are required in order for the NCPF to be effectively 
implemented as the absence of any of the factors can lead to the policy not being 






























Chapter 5 of this report focuses on providing a presentation and an analysis of the 
data gathered by the researcher during the data gathering phase. This chapter is 
divided into two sections. The first section provides a presentation of the 
transcription of the raw data gathered during the data collection phase, this section 
provides the transcribed responses given by respondents during the data gathering 
phase with no analysis conducted by the researcher. The researcher only 
transcribed the raw data so as it make it easier to read without making changes to 
the actual responses provided by the respondents. During the note taking-practice, 
the researcher was constrained by the short-ness of time and attention as the main 
attention was on the conducting the actual interview and as such the notes were 
fragmentary, incomplete and cryptic (Yin, 2011). This therefore necessitated the 
need to revise the field notes to convert them into a more formal set of notes which 
are included into the research report.  
 
The transcribed responses gathered during the data gathering sessions are 
presented in three groups thereby addressing the three overall research questions. 
These responses are categorised in terms of the three overall research questions 
namely; To what extent were the objectives of the NCPF attained since 
implementation? What key factors strengthen or impede policy outputs and impacts? 
What measures should be put in place to ensure the effective implementation of the 
NCPF? In presenting the findings, the researcher provides a feedback of the 
responses provided by respondents to all questions which were posed by the 
researcher. Responses are presented under the relevant research question and as 
such are presented in a sequence from the first respondent to the last one. To 
emphasise its responsibilities, the DTPS was only mandated to implement 
cybersecurity measures outlined on the NCPF namely; the establishment of a 
Cybersecurity Hub, the rolling-out of a Cybersecurity Awareness Programme, and to 




As soon as the responses are presented, the researcher then provides an analysis 
of these responses with an intension of addressing the problem statement as well as 
answering the three overall research questions. When conducting data analysis, the 
researcher followed a deductive approach of analysis as the researcher was already 
familiar with the codes and therefore aimed to confirm or explain a phenomenon. 
The researcher used codes which have already been identified from various studies 
conducted in the chosen research area. These codes have already been identified 
during the literature review and therefore were used as key words in the data 
collection stage. Unlike the presentation of the findings which is divided into three 
segments, data analysis will only be presented into one segment, namely, the 
barriers in the implementation of the NCPF. This is as the main purpose of this study 
was to fully uncover the barrier in implementation of the NCPF.  
 
5.2 Data Presentation  
 
 To what extent were the NCPF objectives allocated to the DTPS attained since 
implementation? 
 
In addressing the first research question, Respondent 01 first defined the NCPF as 
a policy document which provides guidance to legislatives in the South African 
cybersecurity domain. The objectives of the NCPF which were allocated to the 
DTPS, according to Respondent 01 were the establishment of the Cybersecurity 
Hub, the establishment of the CSIRT and various Sector CSIRTs, the establishment 
and operationalization of the Cybersecurity Centres as well as the rolling out of the 
cybersecurity awareness program. Respondent 01 stated that the CSIRT is 
established, however the end goal is a fully functional CSIRT which is currently being 
developed. According to Respondent 01, most NCPF objectives have been achieved 
and there are currently attempts being made by the DTPS to achieve the remainder.  
 
Respondent 02 stated that the NCPF is a policy which intends to bridge the gap that 
currently exists and to deal with duplications of similar functions in various 
government department. The NCPF according to Respondent 02, is aimed at 
establishing a single policy which will have a by-in from all stakeholders. The role of 
the DTPS according to Responder 02 is to deal with softer issued rather than the 
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hard issues in IT Security and furthermore the NCPF is one policy which covers all 
role-players in the cybersecurity environment. The objectives of the NCPF have not 
been fully achieved according to Respondent 02. Although established, the 
Cybersecurity Hub was delayed due to financial constrains which is still a problem as 
the Cybersecurity Hub is unable to being a one stop cybersecurity contact centre as 
there are limited funds.  
 
According to Respondent 02, the rolling out of a cybersecurity awareness 
programme is currently underway and the DTPS is working closely with the GCIS. 
There are already cybersecurity electronic billboards erected on major highways in 
and around Pretoria, there is also a brochure which has been distributed to the 
public, this brochure is designed to cater for different audiences, there is one for 
young people and another for the elderly.  As much as these cybersecurity initiatives 
have been implemented, the impact is currently not seen, this according to 
Respondent 02 is because the cybersecurity concept is an international concept 
which is relatively new in SA and therefore only known by limited individuals.    
 
Respondent 03 defined the NCPF as a policy framework that sets out how SA 
should deal with cybersecurity matters, it is an all-encompassing policy document 
which includes the economy, social security and cybersecurity as a whole. The 
NCPF according to Respondent 03, mandated the DTPS to establish a 
Cybersecurity Hub which is a platform to pull together the public and private sectors 
in information security. According to Respondent 03, the coordination of all 
stakeholders in the cybersecurity environment is not yet done, what has been 
achieve however, is the establishment of the Cybersecurity Hub which is currently 
operational. The second responsibility of the DTPS is to roll out a cybersecurity 
awareness program, this is currently been done by the department. The awareness 
program therefore engages the public in cybersecurity matters.  
 
According to Respondent 03, there has also been an establishment of and 
installation of electronic billboards which are currently up in major roads in Pretoria. 
Furthermore, there is also a cybersecurity brochure which has been printed and 
distributed to the general public. According to Respondent 03, the objectives of the 
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NCPF have been preliminarily achieved, there is however more work to be done to 
ensure the full implementation.    
 
According to Respondent 04, the NCPF is a strategy document which foresters or 
classifies the roles which should be played by government departments in 
cybersecurity. The NCPF according to Respondent 04, sets a roadmap of the 
country on securing the cyberspace. Respondent 04, informed that they are more 
advanced as compared to other government departments in the implementation of 
the NCPF, this is with regards to the establishment and operationalizing of the 
Cybersecurity Hub. Although the objectives of the NCPF have not been fully 
implemented, Respondent 04 believes that the DTPS has achieved a 30% 
implementation of the objectives of the NCPF.  
 
Respondent 04 also stated that that there are various other structures within the 
DTPS who are assisting in the implementation of the NCPF objectives namely; the 
Legal department assist in the establishment of IT disclaimers, the Human 
Resources department assist in the recruitment of personnel, the Supply Chain 
Management department assist in the procurement of equipment’s. The CSIR as a 
sister department of the DTPS which has also been mandated by the NCPF is also 
assisting in the implementation of the NCPF, according to Respondent 04. The CSIR 
has deployed two officials in the Cybersecurity Hub which are assisting in providing 
technical knowledge.  
 
Respondent 05, defined the NCPF as a policy document which facilitates the 
formation of a curriculum which deals with the establishment and operationalization 
of the CSIRTs. According to Respondent 05, it also compels the Department of 
Education (DoE) to develop a cybersecurity curriculum with assistance from the 
DTPS which will be rolled out to the general public. Respondent 05 informed that the 
DTPS’s Gender and Disability Unit has developed a policy on online child protection 
which aims to protect children against cybercrime. This Unit has conducted 
awareness briefings in various schools and has partnered with Google and the film 
and publication board (FPB). NEMISA, an intermediary of the DTPS has been 
established to assist in the development of technical skills and knowledge in rural 




According to Respondent 05, there has also been a distribution of cybersecurity 
awareness booklets which has been given to the general public. It was also stated 
by Respondent 05 that a lot has been done with regards to cybersecurity awareness, 
due to political restrictions and mandate changes, there is however, some objectives 
which could not be implemented. Finally, Respondent 05 informed that the NCPF is 
not clear on the responsibilities of role-players as well as the time-frames wherein 
the objectives should be met. It is therefore hard to determine whether or not the 
objectives were met.      
 
 What key factors strengthen or impede policy outputs and impacts in the DTPS? 
 
With regards to the factors impeding the implementation of the NCPF, Respondent 
01 stated that, although the Cybersecurity Hub was established 09 months ago, 
there is currently a shortage in the skills required to operate a fully functional 
Cybersecurity Hub. Secondly, Respondent 01 also stated that the Cybersecurity 
concept is a cross border phenomenon and therefore it is rather challenging for the 
DTPS to achieve the set objectives as there is no communication with international 
cybersecurity players. With regards to the factors which strengthen the 
implementation, Respondent 01 alluded to the growing interest in the cybersecurity 
space which has had a positive impact in terms of people adhering to the 
cybersecurity measures communicated by the DTPS.     
 
Respondent 02 stated that the factors strengthening the implementation of the 
NCPF in the DTPS is due to there being good working relations among stakeholders 
mandated by the NCPF and therefore a common understanding by all players. 
Furthermore, Respondent 02 stated that the DTPS has established working relations 
with the European Council (EU) in terms of the development of cybersecurity skills 
by the EU to South African government departments. Respondent 02 also mentioned 
that the relations which currently exist between SA and various African states in 
namely the AU and the South African Development Community (SADC) regions 
have assisted in the implementation of the NCPF. What is impeding the 
implementation for the NCPF, according to Respondent 02 is the lack of 
understanding of cybersecurity by the general population, the lack of cybersecurity 
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skill in SA as a whole has resulted in the department not moving at a desired pace, 
and finally the lack of funding is also regarded as a major impeding factor.   
 
When looking at the factors impeding and strengthening the implementation of the 
NCPF, Respondent 03 stated that it is hard to determine the progress made in the 
implementation as there is no transparency among stakeholders mandated by the 
NCPF, such organisations are not working together as required, the Cybersecurity 
Hub is supposed to be a platform that such interaction takes place, however, it is 
currently not being utilised. Respondent 03 furthermore stated that sensitive 
information is often being given to irrelevant people often through a telephone or 
email which is also vulnerable to cybercrime. Finally, Respondent 03 stated that the 
current protocols which are followed in decision making often makes it impossible to 
proactively respond to a cyber-threats. Respondent 03 however, stated that relevant 
parties to provide accurate responses are those in operational structures and 
therefore since Respondent 03 is not employed as a cybersecurity operative, he was 
unable to provide a response. 
 
Respondent 04 stated that the factors which strengthen the implementation of the 
NCPF is the research conducted by the CSIR which has provided guidance in the 
governance framework by identifying the international best practices and aligning 
then to the specific need of the country and then providing advice to the DTPS. With 
regards to factors impeding the implementation of the NCPF, Respondent 04 stated 
that there is a lack of support from other stakeholders mandated by the NCPF, there 
are currently few officials employed at the Cybersecurity Hub who are expected to 
service the entire country and finally, there has been a lot of criticism against officials 
employed at the Cybersecurity Hub and this has negatively affected the staff 
deployed at the Hub.      
 
When responding to the question on the factors impeding the implementation of the 
NCPF, Respondent 05 stated that there has recently been conflict between the 
Cybersecurity Hub and the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation Unit also 
known as the HAWKS who have criticised the DTPS of interfering with evidence 
when analysing information received informing of a cybercrime, this according to 
Respondent 04 has had a negative impact as officials in the Hub ended up being 
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uncertain of their roles and responsibilities as mandated by the NCPF. Secondly, 
Respondent 04 stated that the competition in various sector; namely banks, has 
affected the establishment of Sector CSIRT as there was a lack of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with regards to the sharing of information in a Sector CSIRT.  
 
Respondent 05 furthermore stated that there is currently a problem with regards to 
whose responsibility it is to monitor the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) 
as the SSA is mandated thereto however, it is not carrying out the function. 
Furthermore, Respondent 05 stated that there are no working relations among 
stakeholders highlighted in the NCPF. Respondent 05 also believes that the support 
from the Minister of the DTPS has greatly assisted in the implementation of some of 
the objectives of the NCPF, such as in the establishment of the Cybersecurity Hub.        
 
 What measures should be put in place by the DTPS to ensure the effective 
implementation of the NCPF? 
 
When requested to recommend measure to be put in place in assisting in the 
implementation of the NCPF, Respondent 01 stated that a cybersecurity skills 
development programme should be developed within the framework of the Sector 
Education and Training Authorities (SETA), SETA’s should in this instance be 
approached to prepare standardised cybersecurity approaches in courses which will 
be attended by both the public and private sectors. Respondent 01 also 
recommended that minimum standards for the cybersecurity space should be jointly 
established by all role-players in the cybersecurity space so as to create an enabling 
environment. Furthermore, Respondent 01 recommended that more cybersecurity 
awareness should be done to the public in educating them about cybersecurity. 
Finally, Respondent 01 stated that the NCPF involved all relevant stakeholders.   
 
When asked to make recommendations on measures to be implemented in ensuring 
the effective implementation of the NCPF, Respondent 02 stated that more officials 
should be employed at the Cybersecurity Hub as there is currently 03 officials 
appointed. Respondent 02 also recommended that more funds must be allocated to 
activities working on the implementation of the NCPF. Respondent 02 recommended 
that the Cybersecurity Hub should either be moved to a much bigger space or the 
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current space be extended as they are the only Hub servicing the entire country 
which is currently occupying a small space. 
 
Respondent 02 recommended that the DTPS should build relations with various 
regional and international counter-parts thereby establishing cross-border relations 
as cyberspace is borderless. Furthermore, Responder 02 recommended that the 
officials working at the forefront must have an extensive understanding of 
cybersecurity and thus improve on the current communication with stakeholders in 
the NCPF.  Respondent 02 also highlighted the importance of the involvement of the 
private sector in the implementation of the NCPF also more specifically in the rolling 
out of the Sector CSIRTs. Additionally, Respondent 04 recommended that a 
programme should be established to train ‘Cyber Police’ whose responsibility will be 
the policing of the cyberspace, these positions should be occupied by the 
unemployed graduates. Finally, Respondent 04 recommended that SA should 
consider producing its own IT equipments rather than importing, this is as there is a 
possibility of the imported equipment’s to be bugged even though we secure them.    
 
In providing recommendations to assist in the effective implementation of the NCPF, 
Respondent 03 stated that there must be more funding allocated to the 
implementation of the NCPF, furthermore, Respondent 03 stated that there must be 
programs in place to provide cybersecurity training to officials mandated to 
implement the NCPF.  Finally, Respondent 03 recommended that there must be a 
single Cybersecurity Hub established wherein officials from all stakeholders will be 
deployed, the permanent deployment of officials from different departments will 
enable the Cybersecurity Hub to promptly respond to an incident as there will be an 
immediate analysis and dissemination of information.   
 
When requested to provide recommendations in the effective implementation of the 
NCPF, Respondent 04 stated that all stakeholders mandated to ensure the 
implementation should work together despite their differences and the JCPS cluster 
should be more involved in operational matter as they currently are not involved. 
Respondent 04 stated that the management must be trained on cybersecurity 
matters so as for them to have an understanding of the core function. Respondent 
04 recommended that SITA should be contacted to provide IT security infrastructure 
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and furthermore be involved in the overall implementation of the NCPF. Respondent 
04 thus recommended that more cybersecurity awareness programmes must be 
rolled out so as to educate the general population on cybersecurity measures such 
as the secure use of the cyberspace. Finally, Respondent 04 stated that the 
Department of Agriculture and Forestry should have been included in the NCPF as it 
has the capability of communicating with rural communities across the country.  
 
As a recommendation in the effective implementation of the NCPF, Respondent 05 
stated that the cybercrimes bill should urgently be passed in parliament and thus be 
enforced so as to act on cybercriminals. Respondent 03 thus recommended that all 
departments with overlapping mandates should develop a MoU which will deal with 
the mandate clashes as well as creating an effective environment to carry out the 
duties and thus establish a working manual with responsibilities which must be 
approved by heads of departments.  Respondent 05 could not provide more 
recommendations in the effective implementation of the NCPF as it is believed by 
Respondent 05 that the implementation depend on a huge number of factors some 
of which have been addressed in preceding questions.  
 
5.3 Data Analysis: Barriers in the implementations of the NCPF  
 
Thematic analysis is a general approach to analysing qualitative data which involves 
these or patterns derived from the raw data (Wagner et al., 2012).Thematic analysis 
was applied in this research as the researcher intended assessing the status of 
implementation of the NCPF by means of interviewing various individuals in the 
DTPS. Following data collection, the researcher transcribed the interviews and 
thereafter identified units of analysis which were thereafter labelled with a code. The 
codes identified will be presented in the section below and will be integrated in the 
relevant sections.  
 
A total of five officials employed by the DTPS were interviewed by the researcher 
when conducting research on the barriers of implementation of the NCPF. Prior to 
the collection of the data, the researcher conducted a literature review whereby 
various academic sources including books and journals, policies and regulations, 
acts of parliament and various cybersecurity-related documents were consulted. This 
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was done with an intension of first establishing a solid understanding of the NCPF in 
terms of its goals and objectives, its stakeholders, the status of implementation, its 
effectiveness or lack thereof, and finally the barriers of implementation. During this 
exercise, the researcher uncovered that the NCPF was not effectively implemented 
as projected when approved in 2002. With that therefore, the researcher then 
conducted this study with an intension of uncovering the reasons why the NCPF has 
not been effectively implemented as projected and to thus make recommendations 
which will be communicated to all relevant stakeholders in the NCPF.   
 
All respondents interviewed agreed that the DTPS has moderately achieved its 
obligations in terms of implementing the objectives of the NCPF. Respondent 01 
mentioned that the Cybersecurity Hub has been established, however the end goal 
is a fully functional National CSIRT which is currently being established. Respondent 
02 stated that, although established, the Cybersecurity Hub was established late due 
to financial constraints. Respondent 03 on the other hand stated that as much as the 
Hub is active and fully functional, it is not serving its core function, which is the 
contact 24-hour point of contact for all role-players as mandated by the NCPF, this is 
however disputed by Respondents 04 and 05 who state that the Hub is constantly 
used by other stakeholders, there however tends to be clashed in terms the 
responsibilities with some stakeholders often criticising officials at the Hub of 
tampering with evidence often when sensitive information is reported. The codes 
identified were the lack of coordination and cooperation by stakeholders.   
 
Another DTPS responsibility is the rolling-out of a cybersecurity awareness 
programme as per the objectives of the NCPF. This is according to Respondents 01, 
02, 03 and 05 was achieved as there is currently a cybersecurity awareness program 
being rolled out by the DTPS. The code identified was commitment by DTPS 
officials.  Respondent 01 stated that the cybersecurity awareness program is an on-
going program which has already been launched by the department. Respondent 02 
on the other hand stated that there has been electronic billboards erected on major 
highways in and around Pretoria, there is also a brochure which has been distributed 
to the public. Respondent 03 concurred with Respondent 02 and furthermore made 
mention of the electronic billboard as well as the awareness booklet which are 




In addition to this, Respondent 05 also mentioned the role played by the DTPS’s 
Gender and Disability Unit, this unit has developed a policy on online child protection 
which is entirely aimed at the protection of children against cybercrime. This Unit has 
conducted awareness briefings in various schools and has furthermore partnered 
with Google and the FPB. Respondent 05 furthermore mentioned the role played by 
NEMISA in partnership with the Government Communication Information Services 
(GCIS) in terms of the development of technical skills and knowledge in rural 
communities throughout the country. When compared to other role players, 
Respondent 04 believes that the DTPS has achieved most of the objectives set, 
according to Respondent 04, the DTPS has achieved approximately 30% of the 
objectives as out lined on the NCPF.   
 
As much as the DTPS has implemented the objectives of the NCPF which were their 
responsibility, their impact is not yet seen in the country at large due the late rolling 
out of a cybersecurity awareness programme as stated by Respondent 02. Although 
established, this awareness programme does not cater to all individuals in the 
country as it is not designed in all South African official languages. Code derived 
from this data is that of a lack of understanding by some officials and also a lack of 
resources to roll-out a successful cybersecurity awareness programme.  This factor 
was also mentioned by Grobler et al (2007) as they stated that the absence of 
African languages has a direct impact on the vulnerability of the African cyberspace 
due to a lack of cognizance, this is as computer users often willing to learn about 
cyberspace are restricted to do this, because African languages are used minimally 
in cyberspace. Once such individuals have an exposure to cyberspace, they tend to 
be vulnerable as they often display sensitive information which adversaries may use 
to commit cybercrime.  
 
The shortage of skilled cybersecurity officials is one of the major factors currently 
acting as barriers in the implementation of the NCPF objectives and more 
specifically, the establishment of the Cybersecurity Hub.  A Code in this regard is the 
shortage of skills. Respondent 01 outlined the shortage of skills as a major problem 
that the DTPS is currently confronted with, this aspect was furthermore emphasised 
by Respondent 02 who in turn stated that the lack of cybersecurity skills in SA as a 
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whole has resulted in the DTPS not moving at a desired pace as projected when 
implementing the NCPF. This factor was also highlighted by Van Nieuwkerk in 
chapter 02. Van Nieuwkerk (2015) believes though these laws exist, their 
effectiveness has diminished overtime due to the insufficient training given to 
stakeholders entrusted with the implementation responsibility. What is therefore 
required in this instance is to either amend the act or to formulate a policy which 
supports the actual implementation of the Acts outlined.  
 
The time-delay between policy development and implementation is also seen as one 
of the factors negatively affecting the implementation of the NCPF. This was also 
made evident with the delayed establishment of the Cybersecurity Hub, the code 
derived in this regard was a lack of accountability. The time-delay can be attributed 
to a number of factors one of them being mandate changes, as the NCPF 
implementation mandate was initially, in March 2012, given to SSA and then later in 
2012 given to the DTPS (Globler, et al., 2007), the same mandate was later on given 
back to SSA. Additionally, political interference was also identified as a code in this 
regard. This then resulted to the delay in the policy implementation. Currently the 
main custodian entrusted with the overall implementation of the NCPF is the SSA 
who is accountable to the JCPS cluster. This is not the true case in reality as the 
main point of contact for cybersecurity operations is the Cybersecurity Hub which 
currently has officials from the DTPS and the CSIR who all report to the Minister of 
the DTPS who is in turn accountable to the JCPS Cluster. 
 
Sensitive information received in the Cybersecurity Hub is currently unsecure and 
there are possible vulnerabilities which adversaries can utilise as weak points when 
attempting to commit cybercrime. All officials deployed at the Hub are not vetted and 
therefore not security cleared by SSA; all officials deployed in the Hub are not 
trained in the secure handling of SA’s sensitive information in factors such as 
information classification, information control, information storage and information 
destruction; And there is currently no official from the security cluster deployed at the 
Hub or in constant communication with the Hub to provide direction in the secure 
protection of sensitive information as per the South African legislations. The code 




Respondent 03 cited the lack of coordination by stakeholders as a major problem in 
implementing the NCPF objectives. This factor was emphasised by Respondent 04 
who stated that there is a lack of support from other stakeholders mandated by the 
NCPF. Respondent 05 concurred with both these respondents and also cited the 
lack of stakeholder coordination as a major factor which is negatively affecting the 
achievement of the NCPF goals and objectives. Although mandated to work jointly in 
achieving a secure cyberspace and thus fully implement the objectives of the NCPF, 
various stakeholders are currently not working together with a common purpose 
thereby not sharing the necessary information which might positively assisting in 
both implementing the NCFP as well as in establishing a safe and secure 
cyberspace.  
 
Due to its global nature, it is believed by Respondent 02 that cybersecurity is an 
international concept which is relatively new in SA and therefore only known by 
limited individuals. There is therefore very little research in the subject area and as 
such, Herselman, et al (2010, p.256) proposed that more research needs to be 
conducted in terms of how badly South African companies are affected by 
cybercrime and whether the newly promulgated laws will be effective in combating 
cybercrime. A code derived from this was a lack of prioritisation by the South African 
government. The limited nature of this research has resulted in there being 
insufficient cybersecurity awareness measures readily available which can be 
applied by various individuals, private companies as well as government 
departments. Furthermore, due to the borderless nature of the cyberspace, SA thus 
relies on various countries both regionally and internationally to strengthen its 




This chapter focused entirely on the presentation of the data gathered as well as the 
analysis thereof. This data was gathered at the DTPS and a total of five officials 
were interviewed. The researcher conducted one-on-one semi-structure interviews 
with questions pre-determined prior to an interview. Where necessary, the 
researcher asked probing questions which were in relation to the study. This section 
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was aimed at presenting the findings gathered by the researcher in two forms, firstly 
by means of providing a transcription of the data gathered as well as by providing an 
analysis of the responses gathered by the researcher.    
 
The first part of this chapter provides a transcription of the findings gathered during 
the data collection stage. Here, the researcher transcribed the responses provided 
by the respondents with an intension on re-writing the responses without changing 
the meaning conveyed. The presentation of the findings is divided into three parts 
based on the three overall research questions which guided the study namely; To 
what extent were the objectives of the NCPF attained since implementation? What 
key factors strengthen or impede policy outputs and impacts? What measures 
should be put in place to ensure the effective implementation of the NCPF? The 
responses to these questions were provided under a question in a sequence from 
the first to the last respondent.  
 
The second part of this chapter focused on the actual data analysis. This section 
however, focused on the main focus point of this research which is on understanding 
the barriers of implementation. The researcher in the section analysed all responses 
gathered with an intension of understanding how the respondents understand the 
implementation of the NCPF recommendations as well as on the barriers which the 
respondents believe are affecting the implementation of the highlighted cybersecurity 
measures as outlined in the NCPF.   As per the responses gathered, the DTPS is far 
ahead when compared to other stakeholders with regards to the implementation of 
the NCPF. The objectives allocated to the DTPS namely; the establishment of a 
Cybersecurity Centre, the rolling out of a cybersecurity awareness program and to 
assist in the establishment of sector CSIRTs have been primarily achieved according 
to all respondents interviewed.  
 
Based on the responses gathered and various sources consulted during the 
literature reviews, it is believed by the researcher that the DTPS has performed 
significant in implementing the NCPF objectives allocated to them as compared to 
various other stakeholders, there are however various barriers which are currently 
affecting the effective implementation of the entire objectives as the effective 
implementation is largely dependent on a number of factors such as stockholders 
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coordination, international and regional inter-relations as well as the understanding 
by the target audience.  
 
Based on the data collected and the literature reviewed, it can be concluded that the 
key barriers in the implementation of the NCPF are not only within the DTPS but 
rather on the coordination of all key stakeholders as outlined on the NCPF, this is as 
there is currently no coordination of such role-players in the cybersecurity hub which 
was developed to be a 24 hour central point of contact which is currently not being 
utilised as such. Furthermore, the shortage of skills was seen to have featured 
prominently as a problem which is currently facing the DTPS and as such, acting as 
a key barrier in the implementation of the NCPF. The next chapter will focus on the 
conclusions made by the researcher based on the entire research conducted, the 
conclusions will then be followed by a number of recommendations which will be 























CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
As a concluding chapter, this chapter is based on outlining the conclusions made by 
the researcher based on the data gathered throughout the entire research. This 
chapter is divided into two sections, section one outlines the conclusions drawn by 
the researcher based on the entire research conducted and the second section 
provides recommended measures which the researcher believes can assist in the 
effective implementation of the NCPF objectives by relevant stakeholders. The 
researcher believes that there is a total of eight barriers which are affecting the 
implementation of the NCPF.  
 
Most of these barriers are within the DTPS, however, some are those barriers which 
are across-sector whereby more than one stakeholder is affected by a single barrier. 
The barriers outlined are amongst others; the lack of trained cybersecurity officials, 
the lack of funding for cybersecurity projects, the lack of coordination by NCPF 
stakeholders and the lack of security cleared officials in the Cybersecurity Hub who 
are also trained on the secure handling on the states’ sensitive information. As much 
as these barriers were uncovered during a research which was conducted at the 
DTPS, a possibility arises that there are some stakeholders with similar challenges.  
 
To counter the barriers identified, the researcher formulated recommendations which 
are believed to be effective measures aimed at addressing the identified barriers. 
Included in the proposed recommendations is the rolling out of a skills development 
program by the DTPS, to establish a more intensified cybersecurity awareness 
programme, to ensure a more coordinated and well managed Cybersecurity Hub, to 
involve the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) to assist 
in the establishment of international and regional relations with regards to 
cybersecurity and to ensure that security cluster officials play a vital role specifically 
in the Cybersecurity Hub as they are trained on the security of the country. As a 





6.2 Conclusions made by the Researcher  
 
As much as some officials interviewed believed that there is generally support from 
their management in particular the Minister of the DTPS, and as a result most 
projects are successfully executed. There are however, some officials within the 
organisation who believe that there are elements of favouritism which are largely 
affecting the organisation, this is as there are some projects which tend to be given 
more preference over other projects often with the same level of importance, 
urgency and amount of funds required. Although this factor cannot be used to draw 
conclusions with regards to various other projects within the DTPS due to the small 
number of the respondent, the selected sample is only effective in terms of drawing 
conclusions with regards to the implementation of the NCPF as all the respondents 
interviewed are either currently working with or have previously worked with the 
implementation of the NCPF.  
 
Based on the research conducted, it can be concluded that the objectives of the 
NCPF are not implemented as projected when it was approved in 2012. This 
therefore means that there exist barriers in the implementation of the NCPF. Based 
on the research conducted, it is believed by the researcher that there is a total of 
eight barriers which are largely affecting the implementation of the NCPF. The 
barriers identifies are not solely within the DTPS as they are similar among most 
stakeholders identified within the NCPF. Some barriers are believed by the 
researcher, to be overlapping inter-departmentally as various government 
departments are dependent on each other for the implementation of the NCPF. As 
per the 5-C Protocol, it emerged that all respondents interviewed are committed to 
fulfilling their official obligations, the factors which are acting as barriers are 
administrative and operational.   
 
Based on the data gathered, it has emerged that there is no common understanding 
of the NCPF in terms of its definition, purpose, scope and objectives. The 
respondents interviewed had differing views with regards to the actual definition of 
the NCPF. The purposes, scope and objectives of the NCPF was largely different 
among all respondents. Furthermore, as much as most stakeholders believed that 
key role-payers were included in the NCPF, there were some stakeholders who 
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believed that some critical stakeholders were excluded thereto such as the 
Department of Agriculture which has the capacity to communicate with the rural 
community.  With this therefore, it can be concluded that there is generally no 
common understanding of the NCPF by the main officials tasked with the 
implementation responsibility within the NCPF. The officials interviewed do not 
understand the definition of the NCPF, its goals and objective, its stakeholders and 
finally its purpose. It is highly important that there is a common understanding of a 
policies in any given organisation, this factor is furthermore emphasised in the 5-C 
Protocol as Cloete et al (2000) postulate that the content of any policy is highly 
crucial not only in the means it employs to achieving its ends, but also in its 
determination of the ends themself and also in how it chooses the specific means to 
reach the ends.    
 
The lack of skilled cybersecurity operatives was seen to be one of the main problems 
currently facing the DTPS which has acted as one of the barriers in the 
implementation of the NCPF. Although established, there are currently few trained 
cybersecurity officials deployed at the hub. The majority of officials currently 
employed are specialists in various other fields and were pulled in to assist in the 
Hub with the provision of the strategic direction, there is currently a shortage of 
skilled technical operators in the DTPS as well as in various other stakeholders 
outlined in the NCPF. This shortage of skills has led to some stakeholders either 
implementing the objectives late or not implementing them at all. This factor can be 
linked to the 5-C protocol, more specifically the capacity factor which according to 
Globler et al (2010) relates to human and technical resources which play a key role 
in the policy implementation process. The absence of these factors can result to a 
policy not being effectively implemented.  
 
The implementation of the cybersecurity initiatives is a highly expensive excise which 
requires huge amounts of funds from the government. There has recently been a 
shortage of such funds in the DTPS and as such the implementation of most of the 
NCPF objectives has been delayed. This was evident with the delayed establishment 
of the Cybersecurity Hub as well as the delayed rolling out of the Cybersecurity 
Awareness Program. Furthermore, the shortage of skills is also negatively affecting 
the employment of skilled cybersecurity officials as such officials are often being 
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provided with higher salaries by the private sector, it is therefore highly challenging 
for government departments to provide competitive salaries for trained cybersecurity 
officials to convince them to join government departments. This factor refers to 
challenges in the institutional context as per the 5-Protocol. (Cloete et al (2000) 
postulate that the institutional context is the larger context of the social, economic, 
political and legal realities in any given organisation.   
 
The DTPS which was chosen as a case study for this research has started with the 
implementation of the NCPF. This has been evident with the rolling out of a 
cybersecurity awareness program which includes the construction of digital 
billboards along major roads in Pretoria as well as the printing and distribution of 
information broachers to various communities. This awareness program has been 
successfully rolled out by the DTPS and has been spread to selected communities in 
the Gauteng Province. The impact of this awareness program is however not yet 
seen in the country at large, a number of factors can been attributed to this namely; 
the awareness programmes are not aggressive enough to be known by every citizen 
of the country, the messages are only communicated in English thereby no catering 
for local South African Languages and as such leaving out a high number of 
individuals, information brouchers are only distributed to a selected number of 
people and communities, billboards are in certain areas of Pretoria thereby only 
visible to local people and only people driving by and therefore excluding a high 
proportion of South Africans. 
 
The Cybersecurity Hub as one of the NCPF objectives has been established and 
activated. It currently has a total of two officials deployed with two managers who 
report to the Chief Director: Cybersecurity at the DTPS. One official at the Hub is 
from the CSIR and is deployed at the Hub to provide technical assistance. There 
have recently been three interns recruited to provide assistance. As much as it is 
fully functional, there are a number of deficiencies identified. All officials stationed at 
the Hub are not vetted and therefore not security cleared by SSA and yet they 
handle sensitive state information, officials deployed at the Hub have not been 
trained on the secure handling of the states’ sensitive information, the interns are 
exposed to sensitive information however they are not security cleared by the SSA, 
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and finally there are currently no officials from the security cluster deployed at the 
Hub to provide direction on information security. 
 
Although established as the 24 hour point of contact for all stakeholders to report 
cybersecurity incidents as well as to proactively react to cyber-treats as they emerge, 
the cybersecurity Hub is currently not being utilised as such by stakeholders. 
Cybersecurity stakeholders currently do not work together as outlined in the NCPF, 
there is currently no sharing of information as is supposed to be happening in the 
Hub. Furthermore, there are often clashes of mandates with regards to sensitive 
information, this has been evident with regards to whose responsibility it is to handle 
sensitive information between the SSA, the HAWKS or the DTPS as the officials 
mandated to manage the Hub which is the point of reporting cybersecurity incidents. 
This confusion has therefore led to some organisations working in isolations and 
thereby individually attending to their own cybersecurity challenges as they emerge. 
According to the 5-C Protocol during the policy development phase, policy 
developers should at all times consider the interests of the policy end-user (Cloete et 
al., 2000). The lack of interactions in the Cybersecurity Hub confirms that there is a 
lack of solid relations among clients and coalitions where ought to be strengthened 
prior to the implementation of the NCPF.  
  
Also closely related to the above factor is the late implementation of the NCPF which 
was affected in part by the mandated changes which led to the implementation 
mandated being initially given to the DTPS in 2012 then later on handed over to SSA 
with not reasons communicated to the officials in the DTPS. The mandate changes 
have negatively affected policy implementation with some objectives being 
implemented late such as the late establishment of the cybersecurity Hub. Currently 
the key custodian of the NCPF is the SSA with the JCPS cluster as tasked with 
providing an oversight role, the DTPS and various other stakeholders are equally 
important as they all are tasked to each contribute significantly in the implementation 
of the objectives.  
 
As cybersecurity is a global concept, the implementation of the NCPF is largely 
dependent on various international and regional countries. There is however, 
currently no such interaction and as such SA is attempting unsuccessfully to 
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implement such recommendations. It is rather challenging for a country to 
successfully implement any cybersecurity policy or any related document in the 
absence of any international coordination. As much as there are relations which 
currently exists namely; with the EU, SADC and AU, there is no constant interaction 
more specifically with operational matters specifically with advises on decision 
making. Finally, there is a lack of trust which has led to SA often not sharing 
information with a believe that they are safeguarding the county’s sensitive 
information, this is a good initiative while at the same time it is disadvantaging the 
country in terms of the sharing of skills.  
 
6.3 Proposed recommendations  
 
The NCPF is one of the South African government initiatives aimed at curbing and 
reducing the growing cybercrimes and related incidents in the country. This research 
has outlined that the NCPF has not been effectively implemented as projected when 
the framework was approved in 2012 due to a number of factors which have been 
outlined in the previous section. This section will therefore provide a list of 
recommended measures which will be communicated to the DTPS as well as all 
stakeholders highlighted in the NCPF. This chapter will be summarized into a shorter 
document and therefore sent to the departments concerned and more specifically 
the DTPS, alongside a request to conduct a PowerPoint presentation of the findings 
and recommendations. Below are the recommendations provided by the researcher.  
 
DTPS employee empowerment programs 
 
An information awareness session should be organised by the Chief Director: 
Cybersecurity. All officials responsible for the implementation of the NCPF should be 
invited to form part of the discussions on factors in relation to the NCPF. A 
presentation outlining the NCPF should be provided by the head of the department 
and thus a progress update should be given in terms of the progress made since 
2012. This information session should be tailored in a manner that it assists officials 
in terms of the definition of the NCPF, its scope, focus, goals and objectives. 
Furthermore, this information session should also establish short-term objectives 
with due dates and a review session should be held in six months following the first 
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session. If the session is successfully executed, it is then that all officials within the 
DTPS can be involved to form part of future sessions.  
 
Skills Development Programs 
 
The DTPS should establish a skills development programs which must include all 
officials working within the cybersecurity space. There are various options currently 
available which can be exploited by the DTPS. The DTPS can sign a MoU of training 
with various SETAs for cybersecurity programmes which can be funded by the 
Department of Education. The DTPS can also enter into a training agreement with 
various institutions of higher learning such as the University of Pretoria, University of 
Johannesburg and the WITS University for short-term certificates on cybersecurity. 
The DTPS can also enter into a training agreement with various private companies 
such as Wolfpackrisk and ISACA who can create short-term courses which caters for 
cybersecurity needs, and finally a MoU with regards to cybersecurity training can be 
signed with the South African Defence Force or the State Security Agency to assist 
in the training of cybersecurity skills. Officials already employed by the DTPS and 
working with the implementation of the NCPF can be taken on these courses. The 
DTPS can also recruit unemployed graduates in various sectors and immediately 
take them on these courses and once completed they will then be ready to fully 
operate under supervision.   
 
Significance of operational funds 
  
The training of cybersecurity officials as well the implementation of various other 
objectives outlined on the NCPF is a highly expensive. This therefore requires a solid 
understanding of the need for the implementation thereof in proportion to the funds 
required. The DTPS should develop a good proposal and address it to the National 
Treasury requesting finances to fund the implementation of the NCPF. In the 
proposal, the DTPS should outline the need for cybersecurity, the need for technical 
expertise, the need for technical equipments as well as the implications for the lack 
of effective implementation of the NCPF objectives. This proposal should also be 
made available to other stakeholders tasked with the implementation of the NCPF 
objectives thereby creating a platform for the sharing of information in the Hub. The 
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DTPS should thereafter create a cybercrime incident record linked to the SAPS 
cybercrime database which must be submitted to the National Treasury (NT), this 
report will quantify to the NT the impact of an effective, fully-funded Cybersecurity 
Hub in a country.  
 
Stakeholder involvement in the Cybersecurity Hub 
 
The Cybersecurity Hub was established as a 24 hour point of contact by all key 
stakeholders highlighted in the NCPF. This is an area where all cybersecurity threats 
are supposed to be reported and the relevant stakeholders proactively respond 
before it intensifies. This however is not the case as there is currently no sharing of 
information by stakeholders. A stakeholder committee should be established 
consisting of all stakeholders highlighted on the NCPF, this committee should 
consists of senior officials with the capacity to make decisions, and therefore have 
meetings on a regular basis. In addition to the committee, there should be a secure 
communication line created with analysts from various department having access 
thereto. This therefore means that, as much as they are not formally stationed at the 
Cybersecurity Hub, they will have virtual access to the hub. There should however 
be limitations to this access namely; the analyst can only access their own portal, 
can only receive information once processed by the Hub and communication from 
the virtual analysts can only be received by the most senior official in the Hub who is 
security cleared. 
 
Security Vetting of officials in the Cybersecurity Hub and the involvement of 
security cluster operatives  
 
All officials working with the implementation of the NCPF should be vetted and 
therefore security cleared to Top Secrete by the State Security Agency. These 
officials should furthermore sign a declaration of secrecy which binds them not to 
disclose any sensitive state information. The vetting of officials is necessary as such 
officials will be dealing with sensitive state information which might be used for 
sensitive operations and might furthermore be exposed to secrete state operations. 
Additionally, an information security awareness program must be rolled out by 
officials in the security cluster such as the SANDF, SSA or the SAPS Crime 
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Intelligence. This awareness program will train all officials in terms of the secure 
handling of the states’ information in terms of document classification, control, 
access, storage and disposal. Finally, these officials should have constant visit to the 
Hub to assist in the adherence to the information security rules by officials. 
 
A more aggressive and direct cybersecurity awareness program  
 
Although rolled out, the impact of the cybersecurity awareness program is currently 
not effective. This is as the messages contained are only accessible to a selected 
number of individuals mainly those in close proximity to the DTPS offices. The DTPS 
should adopt a more aggressive approach with regards to its cybersecurity 
awareness program with regards to the utilisation of the social media which is where 
most cybersecurity breaches occur, here cybersecurity awareness messages can be 
sent out to users of sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instigram and WatsApp. The 
DTPS can also enter into an agreement with the South African Broadcast Services 
(SABC) to negotiate affordable rates and then run awareness messages which can 
reach a wider audience in televisions and radios. Instead of using digital billboards 
which are more expensive, the DTPS can print traditional smaller billboards which 
can be distributed to more communities. The DTPS can also enter into an agreement 
with various municipalities who are rolling out free Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) throughout 
the country, their role will mainly be to send cybersecurity awareness messages to 
user of the free WiFi platform.       
 
Additionally, the DTPS can also conduct a cybersecurity awareness road-show 
targeting various schools across SA. These road-shows will be educating leaners on 
a safe and secure conduct in the cyberspace and more specifically in the social 
network sites. A pilot study can be launched whereby five schools from each 
province are selected and a team is established from the DTPS to visit all these 
schools in a period of six months. Once the pilot study is successfully executed, a 
fully-fledged project can be launched and more schools can be targeted. 
Furthermore, the DTPS can also send awareness messages directly to officials in 
various government department trough intranet messages. To start-off this process, 
the messages can only be sent out to officials employed by the organisations 
identified as critical NCPF stakeholders and after a considerable time, more 
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government department can be included. As soon as all the government 
departments are included, the State owned Entities and the Private companies can 
also be included.  
 
The involvement of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
(DIRCO)  
 
DIRCO should also be included as a stakeholder in the NCPF. The role of DIRCO 
should solely be the establishment of international and regional relations with 
countries particularly in terms of strengthening SA’s relations with regards to 
cybersecurity. DIRCO should be included as their line function involved international 
and regional stakeholder coordination, therefore it will be much easier for them to 
connect the head of the DTPS with the organisations dealing with cybersecurity in 
the country which the DTPS believe can add value to SA. Furthermore, DIRCO has 
got a much deeper understanding of the bilateral and multilateral relations as well as 
the sanctions which have been imposed in some countries. This will therefore assist 
in the DTPS not entering into an agreement with a country which has been barred 
from operating with SA.         
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
Chapter six of this report has provided concluding remarks made by the researcher 
based on the entire research conducted with the motive of understanding the 
barriers which are affecting the implementation of the NCPF. The latter part of this 
chapter focused entirely on the recommended measures which the researcher 
believes the DTPS, as the chosen case study, can adopt to strengthen its strategy 
towards the implementation of the NCPF objectives.  As much as some officials 
believe that there generally is positive support from the senior officials within the 
organisation, namely the minister of the DTPS, there is a total of eight barriers that 
the research identified as the main ones which are affecting the implementation of 
the NCPF by the DTPS.  
 
The researcher, in this chapter concluded that there is generally a lack of common 
understanding of the NCPF by those officials responsible for its implementation. The 
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researcher also concluded that as much as the cybersecurity awareness program is 
being rolled out, it is not as effective as required and it is not reaching the required 
audience. The researcher also concluded that there tends to be clashes of mandates 
amongst stakeholders tasked with the implementation of the NCPF. The researcher 
furthermore concluded that there is a general lack of skilled cybersecurity officials 
specifically in the cybersecurity hub and those officials in the hub are not security 
cleared. The researcher also concluded that officials stationed in the Hub are not 
trained on the secure use of state information by the security cluster, and there is no 
visibility of security cluster officials in the hub. Finally, the researcher concluded that 
there is generally no stakeholder coordination among all role-players tasked with the 
implementation of the NCPF.   
 
Based on the above conclusions, the researcher made recommendations which will 
be communicated to the DTPS as well as to other relevant stakeholders as outlined 
in the DTPS. The communication of the recommendations will be tailored in different 
forms and will be written in a summary form addressed to a specific department with 
the barriers affecting that department directly alongside the recommendations. Most 
of the recommendations outlined in this report will be communicated to the DTPS as 
it was chosen as the case study and interviews were conducted to officials employed 
by the DTPS. As soon as the report has been approved by the university, the 
researcher will send a summarized copy to the DTPS and furthermore send a letter 
requesting to conduct a PowerPoint presentation of the findings and 
recommendations.   
 
The researcher, in this chapter recommended that, the DTPS should adopt a much 
more aggressive approach to cybersecurity awareness and directly address a much 
wide audience. The researcher recommended that the DTPS should develop a skills 
development program and enter into agreements with various institutions namely, 
SETAs, institutions of higher learning and private companies to train all officials 
currently working within the cybersecurity space and furthermore recruit unemployed 
graduates who must be immediately taken on various causes prior to working. The 
researcher recommended that all officials working in the Cybersecurity Hub be 
vetted and therefore security cleared by SSA, furthermore, these officials should also 
be trained on the secure use of information security. The researcher recommended 
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that the DTPS should engage the NT in terms of the request for more funding for the 
implementation of the NCPF and exercise more transparency thereto. Finally, the 
researcher recommended that the DTPS includes DIRCO with regards to its 
expertise when forging international and regional relations.  
 
This chapter conclude the research conducted on the barriers in the implementation 
of the NCPF. Based on the research conducted, it was uncovered that there exists 
barriers which are affecting the implementation of the NCPF. The researchers 
individually unpacked all the barriers alongside recommended counter-measures. As 
much as most of the barriers identified are directly within the DTPS as it was chosen 
as a case, the implementation of the NCPF is largely dependent on all stakeholders 
mandated by the NCPF. It was thus uncovered that the barriers in the 
implementation of the NCPF are not solely limited within the DTPS, however, they 
are across all stakeholders tasked with the implementation thereof as such all 
stakeholders should jointly work together to ensure effectiveness in the 
implementation of the NCPF objectives.         
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
Interview Session: 20-30 Minutes  
 
Ice Breakers  
 
 The interviewer will first introduce himself and thereafter outline the purpose, 
scope and duration of the interview and deal with the informed consent, 
thereafter, the following ice breaker questions will be asked prior to the actual 
interview questions.  
 How are you today? 
 Please tell me about yourself in terms your official duties as well as 
how long you have been in this specific position. 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW  
 
 
1. To what extent were the NCPF objectives allocated to the DTPS attained since 
implementation? 
 
1.1 Please provide me with your understanding of the NCPF 
1.2 To what extend do you understand the NCPF in terms of its aims 
and objectives? 
1.3 What role does the DTPS and more specifically your business unit 
play in the implementation of the NCPF?  
1.4  Apart from your business unit, which other unit within the DTPS 
are involved in the implementation of the NCPF?  
1.5 What progress has the DTPS made, in terms of achieving the 
objectives set out in the NCPF? 
 
2. What key factors strengthen or impede policy outputs and impacts by the DTPS? 
 
2.1 What factors, according to your understanding are strengthening 
the achievement of the NCPF objectives by the DTPS? 
2.2 What factors, according to your understanding are impeding the 
achievement of the NCPF objectives by the DTPS? 
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2.3 Apart from the ones outlined above, are there any other factors 
which either strengthen or impede cybersecurity-related policies 
outputs within DTPS? 
 
3. What measures should be put in place to ensure the effective implementation of the 
NCPF by the DTPS? 
3.1 What measures can be implemented by the DTPS to ensure the 
effectiveness of the NCPF?  
3.2 What measures should be put in place jointly by all stakeholders 
involved in the NCPF to achieve the effective implementation of the 
NCPF?  
3.3 Apart from the role-players involved in the implementation of the 
NCPF, which other stakeholders do you think should have been 
involved in the therein and what role do you think they should play? 
3.4 What cybersecurity measures do you think the South African 
government should introduce in order to reduce the current 
cybercrimes and related incidents?  
 
